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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines some of the factors which have 
made the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee an outlier in terms of 
congressional oversight during the past decade. Interviews 
with congressional staff and examination of hearing reports 
focus on eight issues which reached the hearing stage during 
the 101st Congress (1989-91). Five dependent variables were 
reviewed:
origin of each investigation 
Chairman Dingell's role 
subcommittee member participation 
partisanship and minority involvement 
outcome of the investigation
The focus of the paper is the incongruence between 
staff perceptions of the subcommittee and the picture which 
emerges from an examination of available data. Staff 
members describe a subcommittee which is nonpartisan in its 
goals and tactics in which investigations are initiated by 
staff members, conducted independently of member 
involvement, and not intended to produce legislative change. 
What emerges from an inspection of the data, however, is a 
picture of a subcommittee which focuses on the interests of 
its chairman, where active participation is strongest among 
minority members, involves an appreciable degree of partisan 
tension, and frequently results in the introduction of new 
legislation.
The contrast between these conflicting images indicates 
a serious methodological problem in relying primarily on 
interviews with subcommittee staff members and examining 
specific cases to generalize about the function of a 
congressional unit.
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AGGRESSIVE OVERSIGHT:
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE 
HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The conservative mood of the 1980s and the mounting 
deficit accumulated during a decade of divided government 
have been instrumental in elevating Congressional oversight 
of the bureaucracy to a prime spot on some committee agen­
das. However, as a recent report of the National Academy of 
Public Administration concluded, although oversight in 
absolute terms appears to be on the rise, it tends to be 
"narrowly focused, ad hoc and episodic...focusing on gaining 
public attention and having little lasting effect."1 In 
part, this situation is the result of a Democratic Congres­
sional strategy utilizing the oversight mechanism to in­
crease public awareness of and support for programs which it 
perceived to be in jeopardy under a Republican administra­
tion which had campaigned on a pledge to reduce the size of 
government and cut domestic spending.
The key question, however, is not how much oversight
Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies: The Need 
to Strike a Balance and Focus on Performance, report published 
by the National Academy Panel on Congressional Oversight of 
the National Academy of Public Administration, 1988 (Chair: 
Richard Wegman), 44.
2
3occurs, but whether congressional interest in executive 
agencies translates into effective policy management. A 
heightened activity level among congressional oversight 
committees may be meaningless if the primary purpose is to 
increase public support for favored programs to avoid budget 
cuts rather than to conscientiously examine compliance with 
congressional intent. Many of the criticisms of oversight 
during the past fifteen years focus on this aspect or its 
close relative, the "sweetheart alliances" of the iron 
triangles assumed to exist between many committees and the 
agencies and industries they oversee.
In his 1976 study of oversight,2 Morris Ogul lists 
seven "opportunity factors" which provide a framework for 
examining congressional attitudes toward aggressive manage­
ment of the administrative bureaucracy: legal authority; 
expansion of staff and budget resources; the jurisdiction of 
the committee; committee structure and orientation of the 
committee; the chairman's feelings about oversight or a 
particular agency, program, or policy area; relations with 
the executive branch; and finally, individual member priori­
ties .
Ogul suggests that for these opportunity factors to 
evolve into actual oversight activity, two additional con­
version factors may be necessary: policy disagreement with 
the president, and/or external events (a scandal, media
2Morris Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy. (Pitts­
burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), 13-20.
4attention, or complaints by constituents or interest 
groups),3 Further, If the leadership of the majority party 
in Congress believes that it can cause sufficient embarrass­
ment to a past or current president and reap significant 
advantage for itself by calling attention to the performance 
of agency heads, it may succumb to the "irresistible urge" 
to tarnish the President's reputation.4
Throughout the 198 0s, the political climate certainly 
favored ,an aggressive congressional posture'with regard to 
oversight of the Republican administration. The reforms of 
the 1970s had clearly given the Congress unprecedented legal 
authority under the Legislative Reorganization Act to in­
crease oversight activities. An expansion of the size and 
technical expertise of committee staffs and budgets provided 
resources which could be devoted to this activity. A reduc­
tion in funds available for new federal programs increased 
the political incentives for committees and individual 
congressmen to focus on maximizing the efficiency of exist­
ing programs and, whenever possible, to attempt to embarrass 
the administration. Finally, there was sharp disagreement 
with the President over proposed spending cuts in domestic 
programs.
As could be expected during two decades of divided 
government, members of Congress have expanded the amount of
3Ibid, 136.
4Seymour Scher, "Conditions for Legislative Control," 
Journal of Politics 25 (3) (August 1963), 541.
5time and effort they have devoted to pursuing the elusive, 
and often uncomfortable, task of scrutinizing the very 
programs they fought to create. In his study of oversight 
activity over a twenty-five year period, Joel Aberbach 
documented a 3 00% increase in both absolute terms (the 
number of days spent in oversight hearings and meetings 
conducted by congressional committees) and as a percentage 
of total activity between 1961 and 1983. In 1961, commit­
tees devpted 8.2% of their efforts to oversight activity; by 
1983, this activity was absorbing approximately 25.2% of 
Congress' attention.5
However, to many congressional observers, including 
Aberbach, Foreman, and Dodd,6 although more formal over­
sight hearings are now being conducted than at any other 
period in our history, activity is generally uncoordinated 
and relatively ineffective.
The difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of over­
sight is compounded in trying to decide how to detect the 
presence or absence of oversight activity in the first 
place. Critical attention to the administration of a feder­
al program cannot be determined merely by counting the
5Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eve: The Politics 
of Congressional Oversight. (Washington: Brookings Institu­
tion, 1990), 35.
6Aberbach, op cit. p. 198; Christopher Foreman, Signals 
from the Hill (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1977), 272; Lawrence C. Dodd and Richard L. Schott, Congress 
and the Administrative State. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1979), 272.
6number of hours Congress devotes to formal hearings. Lavish 
attention to an agency or its programs certainly does not 
guarantee that Congress is undertaking a conscientious 
effort to determine whether a particular program is in 
compliance with legislative intent. In fact, the reverse 
may well be true if committee oversight or reauthorization 
hearings are used to bolster support for a pet program or to 
capture favorable publicity. And if, as has often been 
suggested, the most effective form of oversight is done 
informally— through contacts between legislative staffs and 
agency officials— the effect of these largely unpublicized 
activities is difficult to observe, much less quantify.
High staff turnover, lack of staff experience in inves­
tigative procedures, and the level of technical expertise in 
complex areas complicate the oversight process. A study 
conducted by the Congressional Management Foundation indi­
cated that two out of three legislative assistants have held 
their positions for less than two years.7 Congressional 
committees must be willing not only to devote staff resourc­
es and time to oversight activities, but to provide training 
and expertise to assist staff members in acquiring the skill 
necessary to do it.
As the savings and loan and HUD scandals of the 198 0s 
amply illustrate, oversight may be hindered by ties between 
many committees and special interest groups. Efforts to
Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies. 14.
7investigate the savings and loan industry were derailed by 
industry lobbyists and their allies on the hill (including 
former House Speaker Jim Wright), despite 31 reports by the 
GAO detailing the scandal.8 If relations between Con­
gress, interest groups and the bureaucracy are too cozy, 
whistleblowers may be afraid to call attention to problems 
within federal agencies and congressional committees may 
relax their scrutiny of the executive branch. Therefore, 
although Congress appears to have political•incentives to
i
capitalize on problems within bureaucratic agencies during 
an era of divided government, the attack mechanism may well 
be tempered by Congress's protective instincts with regard 
to favored programs or by the influences exerted by powerful 
interest groups on Capitol Hill. If there is any truth to 
the accusation that incestuous ties between federal agencies 
and their legislative patrons exist, this situation presents 
a fundamental conflict between the legislative watchdog 
function and Congress' desire to shield programs it supports 
from unfavorable publicity.
Since the 1980s marked a pronounced shift in the spend­
ing pattern of the federal government and heralded what is 
generally expected to be a permanent era of restricted 
federal spending, this decade reflected two often contrast­
ing political realities which dominated congressional poli-
8Steven V. Roberts and Joseph P. Shapiro, "The Howl of 
Congressional Watchdogs", U.S. News and World Report. Sept. 
11, 1989, 26.
8tics. First, Congress did wish to exert influence over the 
administrative structure of federal agencies and subject 
them to some measure of direct accountability to the elected 
representatives of the people they have been created to 
serve. Presidential appointees such as Anne Burford 
Gorsuch and James Watt were viewed as visible examples of 
interpreting executive authority in fundamentally different 
ways than Congress intended. Further, especially in the 
Democratically-controlled House, there were'substantial 
political rewards to be gained from exposing fraud, waste 
and efficiency in the executive agencies to embarrass a 
Republican administration. However, if Congress chose to 
exercise its oversight function rigorously, it risked under­
cutting support for the very programs and agencies it was 
trying to shield from White House "budget slashers" like 
David Stockman and Richard Darman. Many members of Congress 
were understandably reluctant to jeopardize the existence of 
threatened programs supported to a greater extent by a 
Democratic Congress than a Republican administration. Any 
short-term political rewards to be gained from calling 
attention to agency mismanagement needed to be balanced 
against the danger that public support for a program could 
erode, which an unfriendly administration could turn to its 
own advantage.
The changing political climate with regard to federal 
spending thus has significant implications for congressional 
oversight which may replace its traditional management
9function with the need to provide visible support for feder­
al programs in an era of divided government. Since it is 
unlikely that the financial situation in Washington will 
change substantially during the next few decades, this 
thesis concentrated on examining congressional oversight 
within the boundaries of the current political realities 
rather than from an historic perspective. While many con­
gressional committees chose to deal with the fundamental 
conflict' by neglecting their oversight role completely or 
adopting advocacy oversight strategies, one investigatory 
subcommittee is generally singled out for both praise and 
criticism for its vigorous attempts to scrutinize the execu­
tive agencies. That panel, the Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations of the House Energy and C.ommerce Commit­
tee, chaired by Rep. John Dingell (D-MI), is the focus of 
this research. This paper attempts to examine some of the 
circumstances which have made this subcommittee an outlier 
in terms of congressional oversight and the incongruence 
between staff perceptions of the subcommittee and a somewhat 
different view suggested by an examination of available 
data.
This thesis examines eight investigations undertaken by 
the subcommittee during the 101st Congress. The 101st 
Congress (1988-90) was chosen not only because it was the 
most recent, but because it was assumed that staff members 
who had been involved with these issues would still be 
available and would be able to recall details of the inves-
10
tigations. An attempt was made to include those issues 
which generated the most publicity and required a signifi­
cant degree of staff effort. These particular cases were 
selected to provide a cross-section of those issues which 
reached the formal hearing stage during this period and 
reflect the subcommittee1s preoccupation with health and 
consumer matters. Included is one very extensive investiga­
tion which involved over ten separate hearings, another 
which became highly controversial and the focus for widely- 
publicized criticism of the subcommittee, and several which 
fall within the boundaries of what is generally considered 
to be traditional oversight areas. A complete list of 
issues investigated by the subcommittee during this period 
is found in Appendix C.
The investigations examined for this thesis include:
1) charges of fraud and inefficiency in the generic 
drug approval process within the Food and Drug 
Administration ?
2) a controversial paper published in a medical jour­
nal and the ability of the scientific community 
(and the NIH which sponsored the study) to police 
itself;
3) abuses surrounding the sale of insurance policies 
designed to supplement Medicare insurance;
4) an investigation into the safety of the nation's 
blood supply in light of possible contamination by 
carriers of the AIDS virus;
5) the effect of the international Montreal Protocol 
(which banned substances which deplete the ozone 
layer) on American business;
6) a faulty heart valve manufactured by Pfizer, Inc., 
and the FDA's failure to enforce sanctions against 
the manufacturer;
7) charges that the U.S. Army purchased helicopters 
which have never functioned properly and for which 
sufficient logistical support is not available;
8) the effect of unfair foreign trade practices on 
American business after the passage of the Omnibus
11
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
Five dependent variables will be reviewed:
1) origin of the investigation
2) the chairman's role in the investigation
3) subcommittee member participation
4) partisanship and minority involvement
5) outcome of the investigations.
Interviews with present and former staff members of the 
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, appropriate staff 
members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, the 
General Accounting Office, and congressional staff were 
conducted during the summer and fall of 1991 to provide 
background information on specific investigations and the 
operation of the subcommittee. The names of individuals 
contacted are listed in Appendix A. All quotations without 
specific citations result from these interviews.
Additional information was obtained from transcripts of 
hearing reports for each of the eight issues as well as 
newspaper and magazine articles which involved these issues.
Staff members interviewed for this thesis describe a 
nonpartisan subcommittee in which investigations are initi­
ated largely by staff members and conducted autonomously. 
Although staffers express an obvious degree of admiration 
and loyalty for their chairman, for the most part, they 
appear to be convinced that staff interests, not those of 
the chairman, dominate the oversight agenda. They also 
display a lack of confidence in legislative remedies to 
problems uncovered within administrative agencies, maintain­
ing that oversight is most effective when it punishes wrong-
12
doers. To this end, they utilize strategies which enhance 
the subcommittee's image as aggressive crusaders and capi­
talize on their chairman's reputation as a fierce (and 
fearless) opponent.
What emerges from an inspection of the data, however, 
suggests a picture of a subcommittee which focuses on the 
interests of its chairman and where active participation is 
strongest among minority members of the subcommittee while 
the majority of the Democrats (with one or two exceptions) 
appear to be surprisingly indifferent. Despite claims to 
the contrary, varying degrees of partisan tension surfaced 
in at least half of the issues examined. Further, although 
staff members themselves have little regard for legislative 
remedies, fully half of the cases resulted in the passage of 
additional legislation. Finally, it appears that the chair­
man uses his investigative subcommittee as a forum to influ­
ence policy chancre rather than to ensure administrative 
compliance with legislative intent.
The contrast between these conflicting images indicates 
a serious methodological problem in relying primarily on 
interviews with subcommittee staff members and examining 
specific cases to generalize about the function of a con­
gressional unit. Although staff members appeared to be 
very straightforward in their responses to questions about 
the conduct of investigations and the operation of the 
subcommittee, this approach involves obvious limitations in 
formulating a complete picture of a congressional subcommit­
13
tee.
Before examining the dynamics of this subcommittee, it 
is critical to establish why it has gained such an impres­
sive reputation on Capitol Hill. To begin with, the task of 
the subcommittee has been facilitated because its reputation 
as an effective oversight body was firmly established by the 
time Dingell inherited it in 1981. One of the oldest inves­
tigatory subcommittees in Congress, it had a long history of 
aggressiye probes into regulatory agencies.‘ Staff hold­
overs, proven investigatory techniques, generally positive 
relations with the press, and the aura which already sur­
rounded the subcommittee allowed Dingell and his staff to 
capitalize quickly on the accomplishments achieved under 
former chairmen, particularly Rep. John Moss (D-CA), with a 
minimum of delay.
A number of interrelated circumstances have contributed 
to its ability to accomplish significant oversight when so 
many other subcommittees have been unwilling (or unable) to 
do so. First, and most important, are the personal charac­
teristics, philosophy, and power of its chairman. Dingell 
appears to sincerely believe that the legislative branch is 
intended to be the most powerful branch of government and 
that the responsibility for good government rests squarely 
with it. He possesses an uncommon degree of institutional 
loyalty to the House, and claims to regard the oversight 
function as at least as important as passing new legisla­
tion. This view is shared by an experienced, motivated, and
14
aggressive staff.
Dingell has actively tried to lessen partisan tensions 
on his committee by encouraging subcommittee members to co­
sponsor legislation and acting as spokespersons for issues 
under investigation. Among the staff, congenial relations 
based upon mutual respect between investigators and manage­
ment have minimized internal conflicts and allowed staff 
members to concentrate on issues rather than personnel 
problems. The broad jurisdiction of the committee has been 
used to tackle a wide variety of issues and as the subcom­
mittee has accumulated a record of highly publicized hear­
ings, its reputation has provided a significant degree of 
insulation from criticism and political pressure. Sensitive 
treatment of whistleblowers and supportive agency employees 
has prompted individuals to cooperate with the subcommittee. 
A large budget, including the judicious use of employees 
borrowed from other agencies, provide resources which allow 
subcommittee staff to pursue multiple, detailed investiga­
tions simultaneously. A reputation for intimidating wit­
nesses has "encouraged" cooperation from federal agencies 
and organizations involved with the federal government.
Under Dingell's leadership, the committee has gained a 
reputation for aggressive pursuit of fraud and mismanagement 
in the federal bureaucracy. But the subcommittee's commit­
ment to oversight is a highly personalized commitment, 
focused mainly (but not exclusively) on those areas of 
primary concern to the chairman, occasionally overstepping
15
the bounds not only of its own committee jurisdiction but 
beyond that, into Wall Street, universities and corpora­
tions .
CHAPTER II
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
Any examination of the effectiveness of the subcommit­
tee under Chairman Dingell would be incomplete without some 
discussion of the history and reputation of the panel since 
its creation over thirty years ago. Although Dingell's 
subcommittee reflects a change in emphasis in national 
politics necessitated by the tight budgetary constraints of 
the 1980s, its effectiveness has been enhanced by the repu­
tation it gained under previous chairmen.
The Formative Period (1957-7 5)
The precursor of the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations of the House Energy and Commerce Committee 
was a special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight under 
the jurisdiction of the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce during the 85th Congress. This special 
subcommittee, suggested by Speaker Sam Rayburn in 1957, was 
intended to examine the rule-making and enforcement activi­
ties of the "Big Six"9 regulatory agencies in light of
9The Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Power Commission, 
Federal Trade Commission, Federal Communications Commission, 
Securities and Exchange Commission and Interstate Commerce 
Commission.
16
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their legislative mandates.
Table 1 lists the chairmen and staff directors of the
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee from the creation 
of the special committee in 1957 until the present.
Rep. Oren Harris (D-Ark.), Chairman of the full commit­
tee, appointed Rep. Morgan M. Moulder (D-MO), as Chairman of 
the special subcommittee. The subcommittee was never given 
the power to issue its own subpoenas, control its own bud­
get, or for the most part, appoint its own staff.
TABLE 1
SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMEN AND STAFF DIRECTORS
Dates Chairman Staff Director(s)
1957-58 Moulder Schwartz
1958-66 Harris Lishman (1958-60)
Howze (1961-66)
1966-75 Staggers Lishman (1966-70)
Manelli (1970-5)
1975-79 Moss Lemov (1975-7)
* (1977-9)
1979-81 Eckhardt Raabe (1979-81)
1981-present Dingell Barrett (19 81-91)
Stuntz (1991-)
*Three-man task force structure with no staff director. The 
members were James Nelligan, John Atkisson, and Lowell 
Dodge.
Dr. Bernard Schwartz, a man with impeccable academic 
credentials but little government experience was appointed 
Chief Counsel. His intention in assuming his post was to do 
an "overall, scholarly study of the workings of regulatory
18
agencies— primarily a legal one."10
Schwartz' short and controversial tenure on the subcom­
mittee was characterized by his surprisingly aggressive 
pursuit of fraud, abuse, and improprieties in the federal 
agencies under investigation. His attempts to hold public 
hearings to document charges that FCC commissioners were 
submitting duplicate expense accounts and that agency em­
ployees had been bribed to grant TV licenses, failed to 
apply anti-trust policies, and fostered development of a 
patent monopoly in the field of radio and TV broadcasting 
were not appreciated by Chairman Harris. On February 10, 
1958, less than seven months after his appointment, the 
subcommittee voted 7-4 to dismiss Schwartz as chief counsel. 
Moulder, frustrated by Harris' interference in subcommittee 
investigations, hampered by the inability of his subcommit­
tee to obtain the cooperation of the regulatory agencies in 
submitting documents, and strongly supportive of his chief 
counsel's efforts to conduct meaningful hearings into what 
appeared to be alarming patterns of agency misconduct, 
resigned as subcommittee chairman the next day.
After Schwartz' and Moulder's stormy departures, Oren 
Harris took over the special subcommittee and chaired it 
until his departure from the House in 1966. During his 
tenure, the name of the subcommittee changed to the "Special 
Subcommittee on Regulatory Agencies" until 1963 when it was
10Bernard Schwartz, The Professor and the Commissions (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), 18.
19
changed again to the "Special Subcommittee on Investiga­
tions." The subcommittee focused its investigative efforts 
on FTC issues, particularly the rigging of TV quiz shows 
(including the popular "The $64,000 Question), payola in the 
music industry and the accuracy and influence of radio and 
TV audience ratings.11 In addition, it embarrassed Presi­
dent Eisenhower by its probe into a New England business­
man's expensive gifts to the president's chief assistant, 
Sherman Adams, (a scandal which led to his resignation).
Representative Harley Staggers (D-WV) inherited the 
chairmanship of both the full committee and the O&I subcom­
mittee when Oren Harris left Congress to become a federal 
judge. Like Harris, who was a conservative, controlling 
chairman, Staggers had a tendency to be cautious and suspi­
cious and resisted any attempt to decentralize his commit­
tee. In his study of the House and Senate commerce commit­
tees, David Price documents a series of struggles and uneasy 
truces between Staggers and his more active committee mem­
bers which resulted in the development of a legislative 
bottleneck at the top of the committee.12
Staggers sought to reinvigorate the subcommittee, whose 
funding and staffing had declined under Harris' leadership. 
Robert Lishman, who had served as Chief Counsel under Har­
11David E. Price, The Commerce Committees: A Study of the 
House and Senate Commerce Committees. (New York: Grossman
Publishers, 1975), 309.
12Ibid. 19-20.
20
ris, was rehired as staff director, the size of the profes­
sional staff was doubled from 6 in 1965 to 12 by 1967, and 
several assertive, relatively senior members were added to 
the subcommittee membership.13 But Staggers was unable to 
match Harris's "iron rule" over his increasingly strident 
full committee members or strong-willed subcommittee chair­
men who wanted a stronger voice in investigations. By 1969, 
the entire senior half of the full committee, including the 
chairman and ranking minority member of every legislative 
subcommittee, had seats on the cumbersome investigative 
subcommittee.14 Staggers engineered a successful attempt 
to reduce the size of his subcommittee and regain control 
over the agenda, but committee Democrats became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the pace and scope of the subcommittee's 
investigative work. This discontent would erupt into open 
revolt in 1975, in the dramatic multi-ballot contest which 
cost Staggers the subcommittee chairmanship.
Although it had a relatively substantial percentage of 
Commerce staff and a healthy budget, the subcommittee was 
largely ineffective. In spite of Lishman's plans for con­
tinual scrutiny of the commissions, except for a concen­
trated effort to investigate the Interstate Commerce Commis­
sion, most of the subcommittee's work reflected Staggers'
13David E. Price, "The Impact of Reform: The House
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations", in 
Leroy Rieselbach, Legislative Reform. (Lexington, MA: Lexing­
ton Books, 1978), 134.
14Price, The Commerce Committees. 310.
21
preoccupation with communications issues15 and a futile 
attempt to cripple CBS. Other policy areas and agencies 
falling under Commerce's jurisdiction were either covered 
sporadically or ignored completely.
In general, Staggers' leadership did not lead to a 
clear, systematic oversight role. Price's study concluded 
that "the work of the investigative subcommittee betrayed a 
tendency to concentrate on individual cases and aberrations 
as opposed to patterns of institutional behavior."16
The addition of twelve reform-minded Democratic fresh­
men to the Commerce Committee in 1975 provided support for 
Rep. John Moss (D-Cal) to defeat Staggers in a seven-ballot 
contest for the subcommittee chairmanship. At the same 
time, rules changes were voted in both committee and House 
caucus which would increase the authority and resources 
available to subcommittee chairmen, reflecting both a keen 
dissatisfaction with Staggers' leadership as well as the 
escalating trend in the House toward a decentralized commit­
tee structure. Also, Commerce was forced to reorganize its 
subcommittees by the shifts in its jurisdiction created by 
the Committee Reform Amendments of 1974, which removed 
aviation and surface transportation (except for railroads) 
from Commerce while adding additional health and energy 
jurisdiction. The net result was that subcommittee lines
15Ibid, 313.
16Ibid, 317.
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were redrawn and another legislative unit was created.
The Moss/Eckhardt Period (1975-81)
Moss' assumption of the subcommittee chairmanship led 
to enormous changes in the subcommittee; the membership 
tripled, its professional staff was restored to its 1959-60 
level, the budget grew by 64% and Moss held as many days of 
hearings in the next two years as Staggers had held in the 
previous nine:17 from 17 days of hearings in the 91st Con-
I
gress (1969-70), 16 in the 92nd, and 23 in the 93rd under 
Staggers to 71 days in the 94th (1975-6) and 122 in the 95th 
under Moss.18
In contrast to Staggers who operated in a "reactive" 
mode, Moss courted controversy. He had a genuine commitment 
to oversight, which earned him Ralph Nader's* endorsement as 
"the man who perfected oversight". Yet the topics he chose 
for energy oversight in the 94th Congress seem to have been 
selected because he was trying to influence his colleagues' 
opinions about legislation pending before the Energy and 
Power Subcommittee then chaired by John Dingell.19
Moss' first staff director was Michael Lemov, who 
suggested that the subcommittee focus on energy, health, and 
the performance of independent regulatory agencies. Moss
17Ibid, 140.
18Michael J. Malbin, Unelected Representatives. (New York:
Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1979), 133.
19Ibid, 134.
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and Lemov let the issues of natural gas reserves and price 
deregulation dominate their energy investigations. Moss had 
a personal interest in establishing that gas companies were 
intentionally withholding supplies in anticipation of higher 
prices under deregulation, a charge which became difficult 
to prove despite persistent efforts of Lemov and his staff. 
One investigator, Michael Barrett, dissatisfied with the 
direction and focus of what he felt were futile investiga­
tions in, this area, resigned his position in protest.20
The subjects of natural gas supplies, reserves and 
withholding took up 17 of the 27 days of hearings the sub­
committee devoted to energy in the 94th Congress. Two more 
days were spent on Federal Energy Administration enforcement 
and three more on other energy subjects. However, the 
subcommittee expanded its agenda to include other subjects, 
especially health and regulatory reform.21 A potent weapon 
in the Moss arsenal was judicious use of the subpoena.
James Nelligan, Operations Director from 1977-79, claimed in 
a congressional workshop on oversight that the subcommittee 
once issued 105 of them in a single day.22 During this 
period, the subcommittee earned a reputation for attacking 
the administration. In 1975, during an investigation of the
20He guickly found a position with Dingell's subcommittee 
on Energy and Power and later returned to the O&I subcommittee 
as Staff Director under Dingell.
21Malbin, 145.
22Workshop on Congressional Oversight and Investigations, 
96th Congress, December 1, 6, 7, 1978, 131.
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effects of the Arab oil boycott on American business, Rogers 
Morton, then Secretary of Commerce, was cited for Contempt 
of Congress when he refused to turn over requested docu­
ments. This marked one of the first times in history that a 
cabinet member had been cited for contempt. Later, the same 
subcommittee cited HEW secretary Joseph Califano.
Moss kept most of Staggers' clerical staff and three of 
his ten professionals. He then hired twelve new staffers of 
his own,( increasing the size of the professional staff to 22 
professionals and 9 clerical staff by 1978.23 In addition, 
permanent subcommittee staff members were supplemented by 
full committee staff and personnel borrowed from the GAO.
There was a pronounced difference in staff between the 
subcommittee chaired by Staggers and the one chaired by 
Moss. Staggers had relied heavily on staff with FBI or 
regulatory experience. In contrast, Moss and Lemov selected 
staff from congressional offices, public interest organiza­
tions and universities. They tended to be more conspicuous­
ly reformist, more broadly focused on policy questions, more 
sensitive to political implications, and more inclined to 
carry on their investigations in a public forum.24 Also, 
two further kinds of activity were promoted under Moss: 
cultivation of the press and the key role of staff members
23Ibid, 136.
24Price, The Impact of Reform, 137.
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as "hearing examiners."25 However, although Moss later 
claimed he had an "open door" policy regarding his staff, 
many staff members complained that they found it difficult 
to get to Moss without going through Lemov and minority 
staff complained of obstructionism and unfair treatment.
The focus of subcommittee activities under Moss1 four- 
year chairmanship clearly indicates his conception of over­
sight in legislative terms. Investigations were conducted 
either t,o influence items already on the legislative agenda 
or to introduce issues which might result in legislation. 
Moss also maintained the tradition, begun under Harris and 
continued under Staggers, of treating the subcommittee as a 
"one man show", echoing the style and priorities of its 
chairman. In spite of this domination, most majority mem­
bers seemed to be basically well-satisfied with their role 
on the subcommittee since Moss was generous in directing 
favorable publicity arising from hearings to majority mem­
bers to maximize public exposure for their participation (a 
courtesy he was far less willing to extend to the minority.
In spite of the name change of the subcommittee in 197 5 
from Investigations to Oversight and Investigations and 
attempts to broaden its scope, criticisms of subcommittee 
activity still focused on the "narrowness" of the work and 
failure to perform legitimate oversight of the regulatory 
agencies and bureaucracy falling within the jurisdiction of
25Ibid, 143.
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the committee. Critics complained that too many investi­
gations deteriorated into "headline grabbing" at the expense 
of substantive policy questions. Other critics claimed that 
Moss' leadership resulted in a bias against industry and 
health establishment and agencies perceived to be protecting 
their interests.26 Although substantial changes in the 
subcommittee occurred since the legislative reforms of the 
early 70s and Moss' assumption of the subcommittee chairman­
ship in 1975, there were still fundamental problems with
t
translating oversight findings into legislative remedies, no 
clear consensus on what issues should be raised, or how 
effective oversight should be conducted.
Bob Eckhardt (D-TX) chaired the subcommittee for the 
short period after the departure of Moss in 1979. Under his 
leadership, the subcommittee blasted the Interstate Commerce 
Commission for rate hikes it allowed railroads to charge for 
hauling freight in western, non-competitive routes. It also 
branched off in other directions— investigating the cleanup 
of Love Canal near Niagara Falls, acid rain impacts on the 
environment, Blue Cross/Blue Shield efforts to pressure for 
lower medical costs, excessive charges by real estate and 
life insurance agents and household movers, the recodifica­
tion of securities law, pricing policies of regulatory 
agencies and foreign bribery law charges. Energy issues 
under investigation included EPA/energy gas pricing, the
26Price, The Impact of Reform. 150.
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Superfund, and potential uses of solar energy in urban 
centers.27 Eckhardt lost his reelection bid in 1980.
The Subcommittee under John Dingell (1981-)
Staggers' retirement in 1981 gave John Dingell the 
chairmanship of the full committee as well as the Oversight 
and Investigations Subcommittee. Dingell is known as a "New 
Deal" liberal who favors civil rights, protectionist legis­
lation, consumer issues and, when it doesn't negatively 
!
impact the Detroit auto industry, environmental legislation. 
He is generally considered to be one of the most powerful 
men in Congress and the committee which he chairs, Energy 
and Commerce, has claiamed jurisdiction over roughly half 
the legislation coming out of Congress.28 He has no reser­
vations about extending his reach into other committee 
jurisdictions on occasion. As a result, his investigative 
subcommittee has held hearings on a wide variety of issues 
including financial markets, corporate takeovers, biotech­
nology, health insurance, the drug industry, scientific 
fraud, nuclear power, telecommunications, accounting prac­
tices, food, environmental regulations and defense con­
tracts. It has helped to bring down such Reagan adminis­
tration figures as top White House aide Michael Deaver, 
Interior Secretary James Watt, and Environmental Protection
27Compiled from pages of the National Journal from 1979-
81.
28See Appendix B for the formal jurisdiction of the 
committee.
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Agency administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford.
Like the Moss subcommittee, Dingell's panel plunged 
into controversy almost immediately. Its investigations 
into the Environmental Protection Agency, initiated after 
tips from disgruntled agency employees, focused on the EPA's 
mishandling of the Superfund for hazardous waste cleanup. 
That and other scandals eventually led to the resignation of 
the administrator and more than a dozen EPA appointees and a 
perjury conviction for assistant administrator Rita 
Lavelle.29 Called to testify about foreign influence in 
Washington, Deaver earned a perjury conviction in 1987 for 
his appearance before the subcommittee.
In 1984, the subcommittee began to investigate allega­
tions of fraud at General Dynamics, the nation's largest 
defense contractor, an activity which took Dingell well 
beyond his committee's normal jurisdiction and infuriated 
Armed Services Committee chairman Les Aspin. Dingell argued 
that his committee's oversight responsibility for the Secu­
rities and Exchange Commission gave it jurisdiction over 
publicly-held corporations like General Dynamics and, in 
later investigations, Northrop and McDonnell Douglas. The 
General Dynamics investigation, which originally focused on 
submarine contracts and gifts the company had given to 
Admiral Hyman Rickover and other military officials, eventu­
ally led to the resignation of the firm's chief executive,
29Fred Barnes, "Bad Cop", The New Republic. (October 23, 
1989), 11.
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substantial fines against the company, and the cancellation 
of multi-million dollar defense contracts. Dingell's sub­
committee charged that General Dynamics had bilked the Navy 
out of millions of dollars on ship-building contracts and 
unauthorized expenses.30
The subcommittee also conducted an extensive investiga­
tion into the activities of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, 
a quasi-government agency with an $88 billion dollar budget 
to finance alternative fuel programs. Large-scale abuses in 
this program were uncovered before it was abolished in the 
mid-1980s. Another probe involved Electrospace Systems, 
Inc., a defense contractor owned by Chrysler, to determine 
whether an Air Force colonel who quit his Pentagon job to 
join the firm violated ethics laws by helping to channel 
$100 million in business by lobbying former associates.
Justification used to probe the defense industry has 
also been extended to include investigations into insider 
trading, junk bonds, the savings and loan crisis, and insur­
ance company fraud. Neither the subcommittee nor the Con­
gress itself have any formal jurisdiction over the insurance 
industry, a technicality which has not prevented hearings 
attempting to link insurance fraud, the S&L crisis, and the
30Among the extravagances uncovered was evidence that 
thousands of dollars in kennel fees for a dog had been charged 
to the federal government, which was also billed for a bed 
which General Dynamics installed for its chairman after he 
complained that the one which came with the room was unsatis­
factory. Jayne Levin, "Have Subpoena, Will Travel", Invest­
ment Dealers Digest. (December 17, 1990), 21.
30
junk bond industry through the SEC. Dingell and his staff 
have also tangled with Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, two 
of the most visible figures in the high-stakes securities 
world, who later pleaded guilty to securities violations, 
and scheduled hearings on Ellis A.G., a small Swiss broker­
age firm linked to an insider trading network in the U.S.
The subcommittee has been aggressive on trade politics 
despite the fact that two other House subcommittees have 
more logical jurisdiction over trade issues: Ways and Means 
Trade Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over trade agreements, 
and the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Eco­
nomic Policy and Trade.31 A major participant in drafting 
the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act, Dingell actively 
promotes reciprocal trade agreements which would open for­
eign markets to US goods and improve the country's interna­
tional trading position. He has openly criticized the 
Reagan and Bush administrations for tolerating what he 
considers to be unfair trading practices by Japan, Germany, 
and other countries which he charges have benefited from 
free trade with the US while imposing restrictions on Ameri­
can imports.
The integrity of the subcommittee was severely damaged 
in 1988 when an investigator illegally taped a phone conver­
sation between John Gibbons of Kroll Associates, a private 
investigator working for the subcommittee, and a lawyer
31Christopher Madison, "Dingell's Heat Wave," National 
Journal (July 7, 1990), 1657.
31
representing a firm under investigation for junk bond and 
insider trading. Brian McTigue, a subcommittee staffer 
assigned to the investigation, believing that Gibbons was 
working for both the subcommittee and for Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Inc., authorized the eavesdrop. He was subsequently 
fired for his unethical behavior but Dingell compounded the 
embarrassment by playing the tape at a hearing.
Another major controversy in recent years involves the 
series of well-publicized hearings into possible scientific 
fraud in a genetic research study partially funded by the 
NIH and published in Cell magazine in 1986. The 
subcommittee's aggressive pursuit of the controversy brought 
an emotional response from the scientific community which 
angrily questioned Congress's role in ascertaining the 
integrity of the scientific review process. Since prominent 
scientist and Nobel prize-winner Dr. David Baltimore (ap­
pointed president of Rockefeller Institute during the con­
troversy)32 was one of the authors of the controversial 
paper, the subcommittee suffered a substantial, albeit 
temporary, loss of credibility.
In the past decade, the subcommittee has encountered a 
barrage of criticism for its disregard for jurisdictional 
boundaries, tactics, and attacks on the administration. The 
most common complaint mentioned about the subcommittee is
32He resigned in December, 1991. One of the reasons which 
he cited for his resignation was that negative publicity from 
this investigation affected his ability to provide effective 
leadership.
32
that it, and especially its chairman, is a bully. Fred 
Barnes of The New Republic calls Dingell the "meanest and 
most feared man in Congress."33 The US News and World 
Report, tagging him as "the baddest overseer on the hill", 
reports that his colleagues "regard him as an arrogant 
power-grabber who thinks nothing of treading on their 
turf."34 The Wall Street Journal christened him 
"Congress' Grand Inquisitioner"35 in charging that his 
subcommittee overstepped its bounds in the Drexel probe.
Reid Stuntz, the current staff director, defends his 
boss, insisting that Dingell is certainly not a bully in the 
sense that he is usually characterized in the press because 
"a bully is feared but not respected. Dingell is feared and 
respected." He calls him a "throwback to an earlier day, 
when right was right, who believes that honest people should 
prosper." A minority staff member says that Dingell is 
"pugnacious and doesn't mind a good fight", but doesn't "get 
you up there unless he thinks you've done something wrong."
One of his rivals, fellow Democrat Henry Waxman of 
California, claims that Dingell enjoys having the reputation 
of being powerful and deliberately cultivates his image as a 
tough guy. "When people think you're powerful, you some-
33Barnes, 10.
34"The Baddest Overseer on the Hill," U.S. News & World 
Report, (Sept. 11, 1989), 26.
35"J. Edgar Dingell" (editorial) The Wall Street Journal. 
(March 15, 1989), A18.
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times become more powerful as a result," he told an inter­
viewer in 1988.36
Other critics of the subcommittee contend that the goal 
of the investigations is to seek publicity for Dingell and 
other subcommittee members, a charge staff and admirers 
dismiss. "Dingell doesn't need the press or power," says 
one, "he has that already. He is definitely secure as a 
person in wielding power, but he is not arrogant or uncom­
fortable with it." Says another,
He is kind of romantic in some ways in terms of right 
and wrong, though. He has a true sense of outrage.
That is what motivates him, not publicity.
Whether or not he needs the publicity, Dingell and his staff 
are adept at leaking some of their juicier tidbits to the 
press, a tactic which has led more than one senior adminis­
tration and Pentagon official to describe him as a "pain in 
the ass"37 and has led to the more serious criticism that 
the subcommittee is engaged in overt "administration bash­
ing" a charge staff members readily admits may be true but 
is not partisan. Since Dingell's tenure as subcommittee 
chairman coincides with three unbroken terms of Republican 
presidents, there are logical grounds for the accusation 
that the subcommittee focuses on embarrassing the competi­
tion. Those who defend Dingell, however, insist that he is
36Rochelle L. Stanfield, "Plotting Every Move", National 
Journal, (March 26, 1988), 794.
37Lee Walczak, "Big John Dingell Keeps Bloodying the 
Administration's Nose," Business Week (August 2, 1985), 31.
34
concerned with pursuing strong oversight of the administra­
tion regardless of its political affiliation and that he 
would be just as severe if the Democrats controlled the 
presidency. Until a Democrat captures that office, however, 
this hypothesis will be difficult to test.
The subcommittee is also cited for exceeding its reach, 
which subcommittee members and staff appear to consider a 
compliment. Several staff members half-jokingly referred to 
a satellite photograph of the world which hangs in the 
anteroom of the committee hearing chamber as Dingell's 
perception of his committee's jurisdiction.38 Dingell 
insists he hasn't stretched the committee's jurisdiction 
"one millimeter"39 even though he has beaten his more po­
litically inert peers to big issues consistently since his 
arrival on the committee.
The justification for this, I was told by several staff 
members, is that other committees are "owned" by special 
interests and do an inadequate or half-hearted job of over­
sight and Dingell, in his zeal to police government opera­
tions, fills in the gap. Unlike many other committees, 
Energy and Commerce, with broad jurisdiction over so many 
issues, has no obvious "paid constituency", an argument 
which conveniently overlooks Dingell's obvious ties with the
38Apparently, I didn't receive an "exclusive" on this 
observation. It seems to have been shared with most of the 
press as I found references to it in nearly every article I 
read about Dingell or his committee.
39Barnes, 10.
35
automobile industry in his home district.
A senior staffer claimed that Dingell fervently be­
lieves in the responsibility of the legislative branch to 
oversee the bureaucracy, in contrast to most elected offi­
cials who see marginal political rewards in return for a 
major investment of time and effort:
Why does he do it? He likes it. But more importantly, 
he is genuinely concerned that government work. And he 
is angry other members don't show the same concern.
Barrett ,says that once Dingell built up his‘credibility for
his investigations (around 1985), the agencies stopped
fighting. And because the subcommittee had acquired a
reputation for determined exposure of agency misdeeds, few
congressmen were willing to tackle the powerful congressmen
even when he encroached on their turf. Barrett's comments
were echoed by the current staff director:
Most people get out of Dingell's way. If they know the 
subcommittee is on to something, most people don't want 
to go head to head with him. They know by now that he 
never backs down.
The issues of jurisdiction and reputation therefore 
seem to be mutually reinforcing. Chairmen of other commit­
tees may (and usually do) express public outrage over 
Dingell and Company's highly-publicized excursions into 
neighboring territory. But Dingell's political power and 
forceful personality, combined with his committee's largely 
unblemished reputation for tough, thorough investigations 
makes it awkward for committee chairman to challenge their 
motivations. In most cases, Dingell does not appear to be
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interested in a struggle for permanent control of a disputed 
area.40 Occasionally, his intervention works to the advan­
tage of other committee chairmen. Aspin was able to play a 
stronger hand in confronting defense contractors and the 
Pentagon after Dingell's subcommittee began to investigate 
defense scandals. He argued that he had to "get tough" with 
military contracts because Dingell and his watchdogs were 
waiting in the wings to pounce again if he didn't.41
Sta,ff members do not deny that the subcommittee utiliz­
es aggressive, often harsh, tactics to unnerve witnesses or 
coax reluctant agency officials into compliance. The sub­
committee employs two legal tactics which many other over­
sight units are reluctant to use: the subpoena and requiring 
testimony under oath. Dingell insists that every witness 
before the subcommittee be sworn, relying on the threat of 
future perjury charges to persuade witnesses to respond 
truthfully during questioning. In addition, Dingell allows 
cameras into the hearing rooms; unless a witness specifical­
ly asks that the cameras be turned off, the entire hearing 
is filmed. This serves not only to intimidate witnesses but 
to guarantee maximum exposure for any particularly startling 
revelations which emerge from the hearings. He also makes
40A notable exception is his desire to wrest jurisdiction 
over trade legislation from Ways and Means, particularly its 
subcommittee on trade in 1986. He was not successful, but he 
didn't exactly lose either. Most trade legislation is now 
handled jointly by both committees.
41Barnes, 11.
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sure that if witnesses invoke their absolute privilege under 
House rules not to be filmed, the cameras are not turned off 
until after the witness is sworn. "Look, if they want to 
get you on the evening news, they're going to get you on the 
evening news," concedes a lawyer who is familiar with 
Dingell's hearings.42
Committee rules require that the majority of the sub­
committee must vote to issue a subpoena for documents or 
witnesses. If the House is recessed for more than three
i
days, Dingell has the power to issue subpoenas without the
consent of his subcommittee. However, staffers emphasized
that Dingell rarely does this without at least consulting
the committee's ranking Republican. Barrett said that
subpoenas are never issued in a blind quest for information:
I always had some (documents) already. They don't know 
what you have. Sometimes I had them all and would 
subpoena them again anyway. This is to protect the 
source and make sure there are no gaps. We never never 
went in cold and just asked for what was there.
In part, he says, this was done to establish the degree of 
cooperation which the subcommittee could expect. By knowing 
what already existed and then comparing that to what was 
submitted in response to a subpoena, investigators could 
judge the length the agency would go to cover up its mis­
takes. The moment of subpoena is a critical point for 
agencies or firms under investigation. The choice is to 
cooperate or to resist. But as a former subcommittee staff
42Terence Moran, "Specializing in Dingell," Legal Times 
(May 28, 1990), 17.
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member who now specializes in advising clients under inves­
tigation by the subcommittee remarks,
...anybody that thinks the path of resistance is the 
best way to approach Dingell or the staff is doing his 
client a great disservice. I operate on the premise 
that the subcommittee is going to get to the bottom of 
everything and that it's better that they hear it from 
my client than from somebody else.43
One sign of the subcommittee's effectiveness in inject­
ing terror into the hearts of witnesses is the number of 
firms which specialize in guiding clients through Dingell's 
oversight process. Lawyers are paid phenomenal fees for the 
privilege of sitting mutely in subcommittee hearings while 
clients squirm under the heat of camera lights and Dingell’s 
relentless grilling. Unless a lawyer consents to being 
sworn in (which nullifies the attorney/client privilege), he 
is not permitted to answer a question directed at a witness. 
Although all Senate and House committees recognize the right 
of witnesses to be accompanied by counsel while testifying, 
in Dingell's hearing room, the role of counsel is limited to 
advising the witness of his or her rights.
The subcommittee has often been accused of manipulating 
the press to generate a receptive public response to issues 
under investigation. In general, subcommittee investiga­
tions make good stories and staff members are well experi­
enced in dealing with the media, have solid contacts, and 
understand the importance of cultivating the media as a
43Patrick McLain of the firm of Rowan and Blewitt. Quoted 
in Moran, 16.
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potential ally. Not all press coverage is favorable, howev­
er. During the Cell paper hearings, the subcommittee 
received relentless criticism for its "intrusion into scien­
tific matters" as the scientific community rallied in sup­
port of one of the paper's prominent co-authors.
Press interest, in spite of a common perception that 
subcommittee staff are masters at "working" the press, does 
not always result from staff initiative. The subjects of 
many hearings tend to be newsworthy and may attract substan­
tial press coverage without any conscious prodding from 
subcommittee staff. One staff member describing an investi­
gation into bottled water not expected to generate much 
media interest was surprised to find the hearing room jammed 
with eight TV cameras and overflowing with spectators.
However, there does appear to be abundant support for 
the argument that subcommittee staff (and to a lesser ex­
tent, members) frequently manipulate the press to their 
advantage. Staff members, veterans of years of successful 
hearings and favorable publicity, are well versed in knowing 
what is likely to attract media interest and how to strate­
gically leak particularly choice morsels of information at 
opportune moments. Targets of one especially skilled (and 
generally uncontrite) investigator often complain of "tor­
ture by news leaks" and his penchant for "trading up" infor­
mation acquired from one reporter and using it as bait for 
more information from another.
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Subcommittee Staff, Leadership, and Resources
Although the budget constraints of the 1980s have 
reduced the number of staff members, Energy and Commerce's 
annual budget of $5.1 million for investigations and studies 
surpasses any in the House. GAO records indicate that it 
commits more personnel and spends more travel money in 
support of Dingell's panel than it does for the Armed Ser­
vices and Ways and Means committees combined.44 At any 
given moment, as many as 25 additional GAO personnel may be 
involved with O&I staff, which expands both the range and 
scope of investigations undertaken by the subcommittee, and 
provides a pool of potential recruits when additional perma­
nent positions open up on the subcommittee.
Subcommittee staff are characterized by an aggressive 
attitude toward their oversight role, an unusually long 
tenure and a fierce personal and professional loyalty to 
Dingell. Several, including investigator Peter Stockton and 
former staff director Michael Barrett, served with Dingell 
when he chaired the Energy and Power Subcommittee. A sur­
prising number of the full-time staff members have been with 
the subcommittee since Dingell took over in 1981. Three of 
them were there when he arrived: Debra Jacobson, a veteran 
of 12 years; David Nelson (12 1/2), and Steve Sims (15). 
Bruce Chafin, who usually teams up with Peter Stockton on 
some of the more flamboyant investigations, has been on the
44David Rogers, "Rep. Dingell Wields Wide Power to Probe 
Much of US Industry", Wall Street Journal. March 3, 1990, 1.
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staff for over six years. He and another investigator, 
Claudia Beville, are former GAO employees.
This longevity gives the staff a clear advantage in 
terms of experience. Staff members have developed a finely- 
tuned "radar" for sniffing out inconsistencies, discrepan­
cies, and as they like to point out, "the art of knowing 
which rocks to look under." Experience, claims a former 
staff director, is the only way you have to know
...which things are worth going after. There are only 
a certain number of hearing days per session. You need 
to go after things where you can have an impact and not 
waste your time on stuff there is no way to change.
Former staff director Barrett estimated that the sub­
committee probably looks at an average of 175-200 issues in 
some substantial depth during an average congress. Out of 
that, possibly 50 to 70 of them make it to t‘he formal hear­
ing and/or report stage, representing about 100 hours of 
staff work for every hour of hearing. The current staff 
director says that selection of issues for oversight in­
volves a certain amount of artistry in picking targets, many 
hours of searching in blind alleys, and thorough background 
work before a public hearing is scheduled. Most committees, 
he says, have no idea how to "take out" offenders or how to 
properly expose things which need to be fixed.
After years of experience at investigative work, these 
subcommittee staff members instinctively sense when some­
thing just does not "seem right." The Stanford University 
overhead probe currently in the news stemmed from a casual
42
glimpse of the university's 72-foot yacht by Chafin and 
Stockton who were in California on other business. When 
they returned to Washington, they checked it out.45
Experience is one distinguishing characteristic of 
Dingell's investigative team but another, equally vital 
component, is their zest for the hunt and appetite for the 
jugular. There is no doubt that this is an unusually ag­
gressive group. They view their investigations in harsh 
terms, with "good guys" and "bad guys" (generally they are 
the good guys and everybody else is not) and boast of the 
number of agency officials and corporate executives who have 
lost their jobs as the result of subcommittee inquiries. In 
personal interviews with several staff members, it was clear 
that most of them thoroughly relished their roles as watch­
dogs over the regulatory agencies and corporations. Others 
were more restrained in their enthusiasm and a few seemed 
amused, or even bewildered, by their more ruthless 
colleagues.
In all cases, however, this crusading zeal seems to 
arise from a genuine commitment to the public interest.
45They discovered that not only was Stanford billing the 
government for inappropriate expenses related to the yacht, 
but for other costs, such as a $1,2 00 antique commode, a 
$10,000 set of donated silverware, floral arrangements, and 
$7,000 for new sheets for an enlarged bed for the newly- 
married president of the university. They estimated that 
Stanford had overcharged the government from $16 to $2 0 
million dollars a year between 1981 and 1990. The institution 
is now repaying millions of dollars to the government, facing 
additional millions in lost research revenue,and searching for 
a new president.
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Staff members regard their role in cleaning up problems in
the agencies or industry abuse as a valuable contribution to
better government. One of them referred to his job as
... our Peace Corps. We*re not heading off to Africa 
to build dams or teach people how to plant corn, but as 
far as I'm concerned, this is a way of returning some­
thing to society...a lot of Hill staff use their jobs 
as career progression... someone's got to be willing to
do this on behalf of the American people.
Staffers seem to gauge the impact of their investiga­
tions by the "Mom and Pop in Iowa" standard:
i
All we do is to expose the problem. Then we hold a 
hearing and invite them to explain what is going on to 
Aunt Edna. Go ahead; it doesn't sell. Let them try to 
explain it to the people who pay the bills.
To this end, then, they feel justified in extracting maximum
publicity from their hearings if it serves the purpose of
arousing anger among taxpayers.
Staff effectiveness is bolstered by the continuity of
management during the ten years the subcommittee has been
under its current chairman. Mike Barrett, Staff Director
and Chief Counsel from 1981-91, was with the Energy and
Commerce Committee for over twenty years. First hired in
1970 by Bob Lishman when Staggers chaired the subcommittee,
he remained with it when Moss assumed control in 1975. He
resigned and was picked up by Dingell, then chairman of the
Energy and Power Subcommittee. When Dingell took over
Oversight and Investigations in 1981, he brought Barrett
with him as Staff Director.
Barrett was an active "hands on" manager, who became
personally involved in a number of investigations as well as
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directing the efforts of the rest of the staff. He was 
particularly instrumental in the Superfund investigations, 
defense procurement irregularities, probes into the junk 
bond and savings and loan scandals, and accounting profes­
sion investigations. He rarely, he says, attends a decent 
sized meeting in Washington without seeing at least one 
person he has subpoened.46
Barrett adopted a loose style of leadership, trusting 
his experienced and determined staff to conduct their own 
investigations with minimum supervision. He ran interfer­
ence for them when necessary, and was kept informed about 
the progress of the variety of issues under investigation at 
any one time, but did not, as he terms it, "micro manage."
He describes his style as:
...keeping informed about everything, but not in depth. 
I tried to talk to everybody about everything. But 
these people know what they are doing and they are good 
at it. If you tried to manage them too tightly, you 
would either lose them completely or end up with some­
thing that looks like the GAO.
It seemed to work. "In all the time I was there, I never
lost anybody I really regretted losing," he claims. "I was
there less to direct them," he says, "than to
...inspire them. Give them a sense of outrage. I 
tried to keep them worked up so they would still ask 
questions. I made them take vacations when they needed 
them, schedule trips, get out of town.
The present Staff Director is Reid Stuntz, who moved
46Tom Kenworthy, "Wearing Rejection as a Badge of Honor: 
A Carrier of Angst, Former Hill Prober Doesn’t Get Usual Job 
Offers," Washington Post. (April 3, 1991), A21.
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into the leadership position this past spring. A former 
partner in a law firm and prominent prosecuting lawyer, 
Stuntz has been with the O&I subcommittee since 1988 and 
played a prominent role in the generic drug investigation.
He indicated that he intends to follow Barrett's "traffic 
cop" management style, shaping investigations but leaving 
the detailed investigative work to his experienced staff. 
None of the staff members I interviewed voiced any com­
plaints about either Barrett or Stuntz. The absence of 
overt staff/management conflict and the benign management 
style which has characterized the staff working environment 
for the past ten years has contributed to the ability of the 
staff to focus on investigations rather than distracting 
internal power struggles or disputes.
Staff members speak in glowing terms about Dingell's
loyalty to them and unanimously credit the success of the 
subcommittee to his leadership, support, and integrity.
They consider him to be unique in Congress for his genuine 
commitment "to make government work", a theme which recurs 
in their own explanations for why they remain on the staff. 
Dingell's power provides both insulation for the staff from 
political pressure and leverage with reluctant witnesses. 
They openly praise his willingness to tackle tough issues, 
even ones which may hurt him personally. For example,
Bell Textron is the largest defense contractor in his
district. He investigated them. His brother works at 
NIH, which he has gone after. GM owns Hughes Aircraft. 
He investigated them too.
46
A former staff director described Dingell's commitment
to oversight in these terms:
He believes in the integrity of government. At various 
times he has subpoenaed GM, Ford, and Chrysler. Friends 
get no special treatment, no special favors. I guaran­
tee there is no other member in the institution like 
that. One investigation cost him a personal friend­
ship. TRW's head of their Washington office was a close 
personal friend of Dingell and Debbie's. Not any more.
Another staff member said that "Dingell doesn't flinch from
investigating things that need to be investigated." Yet
another said that Dingell's trust in staff members' ability
to do a good job was their "quality control."
If you (screw) up, you leave. The quality control is 
that you decide your job is on the line in each inves­
tigation. We don't get blindsided. There is no quali­
ty control between us and the chairman. The only way 
he can operate like he does is that he has to have a 
lot of faith in us.
In spite of adamant comments that Dingell would not 
hesitate to pursue an investigation that could harm him 
politically or personally, staff members seemed reluctant to 
force the issue. One of them said that she would be unwill­
ing to do "auto stuff" because that would put Dingell on the 
spot. They appear to be sensitive to issues which might 
reflect negatively on their chairman, as in the case of the 
blood supply probe which attacked a popular American insti­
tution (the Red Cross) and attempt to warn him that an 
investigation might be leading into politically dangerous 
waters. Unspoken, although strongly implied, was the idea 
that the probe would be killed if Dingell had not given the 
green light to proceed. Even so, although staff members
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universally report that Dingell's characteristic response 
when faced with the possibility of damaging criticism is 
only "Are we right? Then go ahead.", it is clear that they 
are nevertheless concerned about how their investigations 
may reflect upon their chairman. On the one hand, they
genuinely admire Dingell's willingness to put truth and
justice above politics. However, his position transfers the 
burden of protection from Dingell to the staff. Most of 
them seem to resolve this dilemma by avoiding issues which 
affect Detroit or could cause Dingell problems at home.
Some staffers appeared to be disturbed that their coworkers 
would pursue issues which put Dingell in a bad light, espe­
cially the McTigue incident which compromised both Dingell's 
integrity and that of his staff and to a lesser extent, the 
Cell investigation, which unleashed months of bitter attacks 
on Dingell and his team.
As a congressional staff aide observed:
If you have a good relationship with the staff and
there is an issue your member is interested in and you
want them to look at, there is a good chance they will 
do it. But if we wanted to do oversight on clean air, 
for example, I don't think they'd touch it. You would 
run into a big brick wall very quickly.
Staffers respond that they have often investigated
issues which affect Michigan, including the largest defense
contractor in Dingell's district. They are quick to point
i
out that the University of Michigan was one of the first 
institutions investigated for overhead violations, his alma 
mater (Georgetown University) was called on the carpet on an
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energy issue, and that even Dingell's closest friends have 
been investigated by the subcommittee. However, there is 
still a noticeable reluctance to apply the same tough over­
sight standards to issues affecting the Detroit auto indus­
try that the subcommittee applies to other areas.
The impression of the subcommittee which results from 
conversations with staff members is one of respect for the 
chairman, minimum interference from staff management, and an 
energetic, intelligent staff characterized by less turnover 
and more experience than most congressional units.
CHAPTER III 
ORIGIN OF INVESTIGATIONS
This chapter will examine eight specific issues inves­
tigated by the subcommittee which reached the hearing stage 
during the 101st Congress. Staff members were asked whether 
specific investigations resulted primarily from staff ini­
tiative, at the request of the staff director, from a re­
quest from the chairman or other subcommittee member, or 
from concerns raised by whistle-blowers or other individu­
als .
Generic Drug Approval Process
In July of 1988, the subcommittee began its investiga­
tions into what Chairman Dingell has called "the most perva­
sively corrupt" FDA scandal his panel has ever investigated 
upon receipt of evidence from a generic drug manufacturer, 
Mylan Laboratories of Pittsburgh, PA, which raised serious 
questions about the integrity of the FDA's generic drug 
approval process. Ten hearings held before the subcommittee 
in the 101st Congress described a widespread pattern of 
discrimination, favoritism and inconsistency among of some 
FDA employees and illegal activity on the part of some of 
the largest generic drug manufacturers in the country.
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The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act of 1984 resulted in an acceleration of the number of 
generic drug reviews and time periods for reviewing and 
approving new generic drugs. Although drug applications 
were theoretically to be assigned and approved on a "first 
in, first out" basis, Mylan complained that their drug 
approvals were being deliberately stalled because of favor­
able treatment shown to their competitors by a chemistry 
review branch chief and his subordinates. Their repeated 
complaints to the director of the generic drug jdivision and
t'­
other FDA officials met with no response. Finally, in
desperation, the corporation turned to a private investiga­
tor who uncovered convincing evidence of corruption and 
mismanagement47 and brought this information, in stages, to 
staff members of the Oversight and Investigations subcommit­
tee. Convinced about the credibility of Mylan's concerns 
and abuses within the FDA, the staff director's enthusiastic 
support was influential in attracting the interest of Chair­
man Dingell. A staff member on this investigation comment­
ed,
A lot of investigations begin with someone with self 
interest trying to get free discovery; you have to do a 
certain amount of checking before you decide it's worth 
acting on. Mylan crossed this critical point fairly 
early. Barrett thought it was hot. Dingell became 
excited because Barrett was excited.
47Among other things, the investigator inspected the 
trashcans outside the residence of the official under suspi­
cion. A US attorney later described the prima facie case that 
the Mylan investigator established as "as good as anything 
coming out of the FBI."
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As the investigation proceeded, staff members found other 
manufacturers willing to testify that they had suffered 
discrimination during the drug approval process and tangible 
evidence of bribes and suspicious behavior on the part of 
several industry representatives and division officials.
Scientific Misconduct
The subcommittee's investigation into charges of inac­
curacies and possible fraud in a scientific paper proved to 
be one of the most controversial ever initiated by the O&I 
subcommittee. Its involvement stemmed from a complaint by 
Tufts researcher Dr. Margot O'Toole that a paper co-authored 
by her supervisor, immunologist Dr. Thereza Imanishi-Kari, 
appeared to contain inaccurate data pertaining to a crucial 
portion of an experiment described in the paper. The arti­
cle appeared in a 1986 scientific medical journal Cell, and 
was co-authored by six researchers then at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, including Dr. David Baltimore, a 
Nobel prize winner later appointed president of Rockefeller 
University. Funding for the research was provided by the 
National Institutes of Health.
Dr. O'Toole voiced her concerns about the data to Dr. 
Imanishi-Kari and to senior faculty at Tufts University 
(where Dr. O'Toole had received her Ph.D. and Dr. Imanishi- 
Kari was expected to assume a faculty position in a few 
months), to faculty members at MIT, and later to officials 
of the NIH. An informal review conducted at Tufts concluded
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that Dr. O'Toole was justified in her concerns but that a 
formal correction would damage Dr. Imanishi-Kari's career. 
She testified before the subcommittee that she was told that 
there were already so many faulty papers in print that one 
more didn't make much difference.
MIT requested a formal memo outlining her charges, 
which she provided, and arranged a formal meeting between 
her and key co-authors. Dr. Baltimore acknowledged that he 
had not reviewed Dr. Imanishi-Kari's experimental results 
and did not intend to because it would imply a lack of trust 
in his collaborator. The MIT panel noted some discrepancies 
in the data but concluded that a correction was unnecessary.
The issue was brought to the attention of the NIH by a 
graduate student in Dr. Imanishi-Kari's laboratory. An 
independent NIH panel found nothing to suggest fraud or 
misrepresentation but raised concerns about errors and 
ambiguity. Two NIH investigators (Walter Stewart and Ned 
Feder)48 who were not satisfied with the panel's conclu­
sions continued to pursue the case.
The subcommittee became involved after Stewart and 
Feder informed them of Dr. O'Toole's dissatisfaction with 
the scientific review process at the two universities and 
with NIH reaction to the dispute.
48Dr. Baltimore later described these employees in a 
letter as "nuts who are trying to keep themselves busy at our 
expense." Phillip Weiss, "Conduct Unbecoming", New York Times 
Magazine. October 29, 1989, 68.
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Medigap Insurance
The impetus for the hearings into private insurance 
coverage to supplement Medicare coverage for the elderly 
arose from the long-term interest which Chairman Dingell and 
Rep. Ron Wyden (D-OR) have shown in both the insurance 
industry and issues affecting senior citizens. Congress 
made its first tentative steps into regulation of insurance 
policies designed to cover the gaps in Medicare coverage in 
1980 when it set out minimum standards for these policies in 
the Baucus amendments, a voluntary program which allowed 
policies to be certified by the federal government. Howev­
er, Dingell and Wyden both felt that these measures were 
inadequate and attempted to tighten Medigap requirements 
again in 1988 in provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act which were not repealed along with the rest of 
that law in 1989.49 Discussions around the time of the 
bill and new reports of abuse in insurance policies prompted 
Dingell to request an investigation into the issue.
The subcommittee conducted an investigation which 
culminated in a public hearing on April 26, 1989, to examine 
systemic patterns in the way health insurance for the elder­
ly is sold and regulated. The subcommittee was particularly 
concerned with the effectiveness of the current regulatory 
structure which relies on voluntary compliance with a nebu­
49Julie Rovner, "Congress Tightens Regulation of Medigap 
Insurance Plans", Congressional Quarterly. (November 3, 1990), 
3720.
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lous system of federal standards.
Committee hearings exposed numerous problems with the 
manner in which insurance companies are regulated by the 
various states, which exercise varying degrees of effective­
ness in reviewing industry practices and examining consumer 
complaints.50 This hearing appeared to be designed to 
attract attention to problems with Medigap of insurance and 
to increase support for federal regulation.
Blood Supply Safety
According to the staff member involved with this issue, 
the investigation into the safety of the nation's blood 
supply was a direct result of the erosion of confidence in 
the Food and Drug Administration after the subcommittee's 
probe of the generic drug approval process uncovered major 
fraud and inefficiency in the organization. Since the 
subcommittee had found problems in other divisions of the 
FDA aside from the Generic Drug Division (brand name drugs, 
bottled water, medical devices, etc.), the staff member was 
concerned about whether adequate safeguards existed to
50Witnesses testified that elderly policy holders purchase 
multiple insurance policies which provide very little addi­
tional coverage in return for substantial premiums. Cases of 
people purchasing 25 or 30 policies over five years were 
cited, a result of the differential commission structure 
(called "twisting'' in the industry) which pays higher commis­
sions on new policies than existing ones. In one example 
given during the hearings, an alcoholic woman bought 28 
separate policies between Oct. 1985 and April 1988 at an 
annual cost of approximately $5,865 but received no payments 
for medical expenses she incurred while hospitalized for 
treatment of her condition.
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protect the nation's blood supply from infectious diseases, 
particularly since the incidence of the AIDS virus has 
reached epidemic proportions. However, one national report­
er indicated that the investigation resulted from Dingell's 
comments to the staff about his concern for the nation's 
blood supply after a hip operation a few years ago.51
Ozone Layer Depletion
A subcommittee hearing was conducted on May 15, 1989,
t
to examine the impact on American businesses of the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted 
in December of 1987 to inhibit the production, consumption, 
and trade in chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and bromine-contain­
ing compounds (halons). Chairman Dingell, who has widely 
criticized policies which put American busin'ess at a compet­
itive disadvantage in a global economy, was sensitive to the 
issue that U.S. industry might suffer from attempting to 
comply with the terms of the Protocol, particularly if 
inexpensive and easily available substitutes for CFCs and 
halons cannot be found.52
Revisions to the Protocol were being negotiated at time 
of the hearings and Dingell was concerned not only that 
environmental groups were aggressively lobbying for stricter
51Harrison Rainie, "Congress's Most Feared Democrat, " U.S. 
News and World Report. August 26/September 2, 1991, 53.
52Although 40 countries and the EEC have ratified the 
Protocol, over 80 developing nations, including Brazil, China, 
Argentina, India, and Korea, have not.
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standards, but that the Environmental Protection Agency 
might be pressured into premature approvals of proposed 
substitutes without adequate investigation into the safety, 
performance, and economic aspects of these substances.53
The hearings reflect Dingell's cautious approach to 
environmental legislation, as well as his well-documented 
concern over America's competitive position in the interna­
tional economy. Dingell's control over this investigation 
was obvious by his selection of a staff member from the full 
committee staff to handle it; his views on environmental 
issues are known to be identical to Dingell's.
Medical Device Industry
On February 26, 1990, the subcommittee began hearings 
to determine the Food and Drug Administration's ability to 
monitor the approval and marketing of medical devices. 
Although several case studies were investigated, most atten­
tion was given to Pfizer Corporation's Bjork-Shiley Convexo 
Concave heart valve54 which had been approved by the FDA 
and marketed between 1979 and 198 6 before it was recalled by 
the manufacturer.
A subcommittee staff member first became aware of
53So far, all acceptable substitutes for CFC refrigerants 
have resulted in a loss of energy efficiency. Other substi­
tutes which the EPA has recommended have proven to be toxic or 
highly inflammatory. Many critics of the Protocol anticipate 
that manufacturers will turn to foreign firms not bound by the 
terms of the agreement to purchase parts and supplies.
54Shiley, Inc. was the manufacturer of the valve. Pfizer 
is the parent corporation.
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problems with the heart valve through a tip from a Legal 
Times writer who mentioned that a number of individuals in 
Australia had experienced heart failures attributed to the 
device and that it had been the subject of an investigation 
by a Canadian television station.
The hearing (and report issued on the same day) focused 
on FDA weaknesses in the compliance with and enforcement of 
the Medical Device Amendments, including its failure to 
aggressively monitor (and later suspend) manufacturing 
operations until a solution to the problem could be identi­
fied. The investigation also focused on Pfizer's continued 
marketing of the device even after company officials became 
aware of problems in its design and manufacture as well as 
its failure to notify the FDA of potential problems in spite 
of numerous product recalls and modifications.
Army Helicopter Procurement
In April and May of 1990, the Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations conducted hearings on the $13 billion 
Army attack helicopter, the Apache AH-64 manufactured by 
McDonnell Douglas. The first units were delivered to the 
Army in 1984. At the time of the hearings, the Army was 
planning the purchase of its final 13 2 helicopters (at a 
cost of $1.5 billion), for a total of 807 Apaches.
Subcommittee staff first learned of problems with the 
Apache through a letter which a colonel of the Airborne 
Calvary Unit sent to his commanding officers complaining of
performance problems he encountered during a routine train- 
ing exercise. During the exercise, each of the twenty 
Apaches assigned to the unit either malfunctioned or was not 
operational at the time. In his letter, the frustrated 
colonel stated that if he had to go to war, he would prefer 
to take the Vietnam-era Cobras rather than gamble on the 
performance of the Apache. A copy of this letter was 
slipped to the subcommittee, which then collected a few 
other documents and requested the GAO to look into the 
allegations. After a ten-month GAO investigation, the 
subcommittee scheduled a hearing to highlight ongoing prob­
lems with the equipment and difficulties the Army had en­
countered in maintaining it. The investigation was part of 
an ongoing effort to expose contractor abuses in the defense 
industry.
Unfair Foreign Trade Practices
Subcommittee hearings during the 101st Congress were a 
continuation of a long-standing inquiry into foreign trade 
practices and reflect Chairman Dingell's attitude about the 
need for effective legislation to protect American business. 
The focus of the 1989 hearings was on the legal environment 
created by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988, a product of eight separate full Committees in the 
House alone. The 1990 hearings also emphasized issues to be 
discussed during the impending GATT negotiations.
Witnesses in the private sector representing the tele­
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communications, pharmaceutical, steel, motion picture and 
automobile industries testified that the Act had failed to 
open new international markets to American products and that 
intellectual property rights violations had hurt US industy. 
Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher and U.S. Trade Repre­
sentative Carla Hills both testified before the subcommit­
tee, and industry representatives criticized the government 
for the absence of a coordinated trade policy.
Hearings on trade issues seem aimed at keeping trade 
issues alive and on the agenda. According to a staff member 
responsible for trade matters, the hearings:
...keep the fire going. We have more than enough 
legislation already. Hearings are more to pressure the 
administration to implement the legislation as toughly 
as they should and to keep the heat on foreign competi­
tors... they closely watch what we do. We keep in touch 
with them, in part through hearings. There's an audi­
ence out there; we send messages to them where appro­
priate. We do play on a world stage.
Summary
The selection for subjects of these particular investi­
gations appears to be fairly evenly divided between those 
issues which Chairman Dingell has been consistently associ­
ated with and those which appear to be the result of indi­
vidual staff initiative, primarily as the result of informa­
tion obtained from whistle-blowers or contacts. Dingell's 
on-going preoccupation with trade, environmental and insur­
ance issues resulted in three investigations. The probe 
into helicopter procurement, although prompted in this 
specific instance by a complaint channelled to a staff
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member, was part of a continuing effort to expose defense 
contractor abuse, which Dingell has actively supported for 
most of the years he has chaired the subcommittee. Four 
issues, therefore, directly reflect the chairman's interest 
in specific subject areas. In two of them (Medigap and the 
ozone layer), he used staff assistance from the full commit­
tee rather than from the investigative subcommittee.
Three issues appeared to result primarily from staff 
initiative upon receipt of information from’whistleblowers 
or other contacts. The origin of the final issue (blood 
supply safety) is not clear. Although the staff member 
involved in the investigation indicates that he was primari­
ly responsible for the probe, there is some evidence that 
Chairman Dingell also expressed an interest in the issue. 
Without accurate information about the timing of their 
respective questions, it is impossible to accurately deter­
mine whether the impetus for this particular investigation 
arose with the chairman or one of his staff.
Table 2 lists the source for the eight cases selected 
for study in this paper.
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TABLE 2
SELECTION OF CASES FOR 
Investigation
Generic Drug Approval Process
Scientific Misconduct 
Medigap Insurance Abuse
i
Ozone Layer Depletion
Medical Devices
Army Helicopter Procurement
Unfair Foreign Trade Practices 
Blood Safety Supply
INVESTIGATION
Source
Whistleblower (Mylan 
Laboratories, Pgh, PA)
Margot O'Toole, via NIH 
employees Walter Stewart 
and Ned Feder
Interest expressed by 
subcommittee members 
Dingell and Wyden
Chairman Dingell
Tip from reporter
Anonymous letter from 
Army employee; part of 
on-going investigation 
into defense industry
Chairman Dingell
Unclear - staff initia­
tive or Chairman Dingell
CHAPTER IV 
ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN
Most scholars argue that oversight subcommittees and 
investigations tend to reflect the interests and priorities 
of committee chairmen. In spite of staff comments that this 
subcommittee is "staff driven", the subcommittee under 
Chairman Dingell appears to be no exception. Although the 
Chairman allows the staff a great deal of latitude in the 
conduct of actual investigations, his own agenda appears to 
guide the selection of topics as well as the course of the 
investigations.
In 1987, as reports of insider trading shook the secu­
rities industry, John Dingell accepted a fee to deliver an 
address to a group of security firm senior executives. His 
brief appearance was hardly reassuring:
This is not a speech in praise of the integrity of the 
securities industry, dismissing you to go off to cock­
tail parties and continue as before. And don’t bother 
telling me, "Dingell, it can't be done" because if you 
don't immediately set to putting your houses in order, 
it will be done for you and to you.55
It was, however, a typical Dingell performance— brusque,
blunt, and belligerent.
55Jack Torry, "The Alligator: Mean, Smart, Tough, and
Blunt— Meet Big John Dingell of Michigan," The Blade (Toledo, 
OH), (April 24, 1988), B-3.
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B3
John Dingell first arrived in Washington as a seven- 
year old when his father, John D. Dingell, Sr., was first 
elected to Congress in 1932. His father, a New Deal Demo­
crat, was one of the first big-city Polish-Americans elected 
to the House. He served eleven terms, helped to write 
Social Security legislation, and was one of the sponsors of 
legislation which created the National Institutes of Health, 
an agency now under his son's jurisdiction. The young 
Dingell worked as a page in the Capitol, earned a law degree 
from Georgetown University, and (at the age of ?29) won a 
special election to replace his father when he died in 1955. 
"He is," says former staff director Mike Barrett, "more of a
creature of the House than anybody I can ever conceive of."
He is fiercely loyal to the House and has turned down numer­
ous offers to run for the Senate.
As an imposing figure (6 feet 3 inches, 210+ pounds), 
he has earned the nickname "Big John" (sometimes "the 
Truck") and calls himself both a moderate Democrat, and "the 
last of the New Dealers." He likes to describe himself as a 
"poor Polish lawyer from Detroit" but for more than three 
decades, he has used his bluntness, intellect and the force 
of his personality to fight his way into one of the most
powerful positions in Washington.
Although it is frequently said that Dingell has a safe 
district (his only tough fight was a primary race in 1964; 
in 1988, he won reelection with 97% of the vote), his 
district's voters can be fairly unpredictable. Although the
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Wayne County portion of his district (the 16th), is one of 
the most Democratic areas in Michigan, his district also 
includes white-collar residents and company managers as well 
as a staunchly conservative rural contingent, all of whom 
tend to vote Republican.56 In the last presidential elec­
tion, his district voted 54% for Bush? in 1984, the figure 
was 64% Republican. Although it is not inconceivable that 
when Dingell retires he could be replaced by a Republican, 
there iq no doubt that he has the overwhelming support of 
his district. His district may not be entirely secure but, 
for as long as he wants it, his seat certainly appears to 
be.
Since Dingell's district includes Dearborn and the huge 
Ford plant at River Rouge, he is (predictably) a fierce 
protector of the auto industry, advocating import quotas on 
automobiles manufactured overseas and fighting stringent 
auto-emission rules and improved fuel economy standards.
In spite of his long ties to the auto industry, he is a 
conservationist on wildlife habitat and federal park legis­
lation. He sponsored both the National Environmental Pro­
tection Act of 1969 and Endangered Species Act of 1973, yet 
environmentalists tagged him "Dirty Dingell" for his efforts 
to undo the Clean Air Act. Ralph Nader, who once praised 
him as a fellow conservationist, now calls him "the 
consumer's worst enemy" after he opposed stiffer auto safety
56 Phil Duncan (ed), Politics in America-102nd Congress. 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1991), 767.
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and pollution requirements.57 Dingell shrugs off the crit­
icism by reminding his attackers that he was "not sent here 
to destitute my district or destroy the auto industry."58 
Despite a high ADA rating and a reputation as a liberal 
populist, he is an opponent of gun control legislation and a 
board member of the NRA.
Although he tends to support consumer issues, particu­
larly health-related ones, he opposes health and safety 
regulations which he thinks will unduly tax’ steel and auto 
manufacturers. Dingell is currently backing proposals to 
change product liability legislation, siding with manufac­
turers who prefer federal product liability laws over having 
to deal with fifty separate state laws. However, manufac­
turers want new legislation to replace the current strict 
liability standards holding manufacturers responsible with a 
"negligence standard" which provides more protection for 
industry. Dingell supports this direction, charging that 
lawyers are the only group which benefit from strict liabil­
ity statutes. Although he defends his position by claiming 
that a revision of the laws would ultimately benefit consum­
ers, the fact that the auto industry is the frequent target 
of product liability lawsuits undoubtedly affects his deci­
sion.
Dingell has a reputation for reinforcing his power by
57Anna Cifelli, "Capitol Hill's One-Man Gauntlet," 
Fortune. (February 18, 1985), 123.
58Barnes, 12.
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rewarding allies and punishing enemies, but it is difficult 
to judge whether his actions constitute strong arm tactics 
or merely the adroit use of a chairman*s prerogatives. His 
dislike of James Scheuer (D-NY), who ranks second in senior­
ity on the full committee, has made it impossible for 
Scheuer to retain a subcommittee chairmanship. When Dan 
Kildee, a fellow Michigan Democrat, voted against a Dingell- 
sponsored bill in 1982, Dingell shouted to him across the 
crowded Mouse floor, "Kildee, I hope you're satisfied with 
your current committee assignment." Kildee, who was trying 
to get on Ways and Means at the time, still has not made 
it.59 Leon Billings, a former aide to Sen. Edmund Muskie 
of Maine, opposed Dingell on the Clean Air Bill. Years 
later, during an unsuccessful campaign for Congress, he ran 
into Dingell, who abruptly informed him that he wanted him 
to know that he would do everything he could to make certain 
that he was not elected.60
Dingell often operates through a junior committee 
member, permitting that member to introduce a bill while he 
runs political interference for it. He claims this practice 
is intended to "educate" a new generation of skilled young 
legislators who can continue to carry on the legacy of 
public service. Cynics point out that it also multiplies 
the number of issues he can work on, extends his range, and
59Barnes, 12.
60Torry, 3.
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builds a power base of grateful younger members.61 His 
normally successful attempts to solicit bipartisan sponsors 
for legislation builds coalitions and effectively minimizes 
partisan conflict on his committee. He is generally consid­
ered to be more effective in committee than on the floor.
His greatest strength is considered to be his skill at 
coalition building and deal cutting. A crucial element in 
this strategy is his alignment with committee Republicans to 
advance .legislation he supports over the objections of 
fellow Democrats. In a recent markup of the Clean Air Act 
reauthorization in the Health subcommittee, six Republicans 
and three Democrats voted with Dingell for amendments and 
seven Democrats and two Republicans voted with Waxman 
against them, killing them in a tie. During another vote on 
product liability legislation, all seventeen committee 
Republicans voted with him, while only three of the 
committee's 24 Democrats were on his side.62 In spite of 
his liberal/populist rhetoric and inherited New Deal pedi­
gree, in reality he is a moderate Democrat who frequently 
has more in common with Republicans than fellow Democrats.
Tensions often run high between Dingell and some of his 
subcommittee chairmen and fellow committee chairman. Henry 
Waxman, who heads the Subcommittee on Health and the Envi­
ronment, frequently opposes Dingell's attempts to weaken
61Stanfield, 794.
62Ibid, 794.
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auto emission controls. They battled several years ago over 
proposed acid rain restrictions and have often tangled over 
provisions of the Clean Air Act. Yet they are in agreement 
on health issues and their alliance is credited with main­
taining the federal health budget in face of dramatic cuts 
for other programs over the past decade. A pragmatic poli­
tician, he has been quoted as saying that he will work with 
anybody and everybody that comes along if he can do it 
honorably and they are going in the right direction.63
Dingell clashed with former subcommittee chairman James 
Florio over the Superfund, and opposes fellow committee 
members Norman Lent on acid rain issues and Ron Wyden on 
environmental matters. As already mentioned, he frequently 
antagonizes other committee chairmen over his widely-publi­
cized excursions into their jurisdictional territory.
Dingell usually justifies his encroachment by thinly dis­
guised exercises in creative logic.
For example, the investigation into salmonella in eggs 
undertaken during this Congress resulted because a staff 
member became concerned about the high rate of salmonella in 
chickens.
We had no jurisdiction over agriculture so we couldn't 
go after chicken, which fell under USDA jurisdiction. 
But the FDA has jurisdiction over eggs, and we have 
jurisdiction over the FDA. So we had a salmonella 
hearing on eggs, which we had jurisdiction over, but 
not chicken. We were really concerned about chickens 
but got our point across with the eggs.
63Stanfield, 795.
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Staff members seemed to have no qualms about crossing juris­
dictional borders in pursuit of wrongdoers and frankly admit 
that the subcommittee "steps on toes" when necessary. One 
staff member's attitude about criticism of his panel's 
efforts was clear:
We have the physical capability and the power base to 
do it. With Dingell, we have the wherewithal, the 
capability, and the willingness. Other committee 
chairmen have the capability, but not the willingness.
Barrett remarked that Henry Waxman, Chairman of the
»
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, did not like the 
generic drug investigation, but never tried to get the 
subcommittee to stop it. Dingell's reputation for playing 
rough, he said, minimized potential opposition and protected 
the oversight staff from political pressure from the subcom­
mittee or full committee members.
Energy and Commerce shares jurisdiction on trade issues 
with the Ways and Means Committee which is responsible for 
tariffs. However, they work independently, apparently 
because of obvious differences in philosophy on trade is­
sues. Says one staff member,
Ways and Means is more free trade than we are. Our 
strategy in the 1988 trade acts was to get some trade 
legislation; Ways and Means didn't really want to do 
it. We ended up with joint referral. An awful lot of 
what we did was preparing ground and forcing people to 
confront reality. The subcommittee went overseas, 
threatening and pushing, meeting with foreign industri­
alists.
But Dingell's power grabs have met with increasing 
resistance in recent years. The headline-grabbing question 
in a "Dear Colleague" letter circulated by Public Works
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leaders asked congressmen "Has the Energy and Commerce 
Committee Ever Tried to Steal Your Jurisdiction?"64 In 
October 1987, the House rejected a provision of a FTC bill 
to transfer oversight of airline advertising from Public 
Works to Energy and Commerce which had been vigorously 
opposed by Public Works Chairman James Howard (NJ). In a 
"surf and turf" fight during 1990, Dingell angered Agricul­
ture Chairman E. De La Garza (TX) when he succeeded in 
transferring regulatory authority inspection for shellfish 
to the FDA.65 But his fellow congressmen are not immune 
from exploiting Dingell's jurisdictional appetite when it 
suits their purposes. Former House Banking Committee Chair­
man Ferdnand St. Germain once yielded jurisdiction knowing 
that Energy and Commerce would slow down a bill he thought 
was moving too fast in his own committee.66
In recent years he has suffered a stinging defeat on 
the revised Clean Air Bill, which he managed to stall for 
over nine years before reluctantly supporting it in 1990.
He lost another major battle over the FCC decision to drop 
the fairness doctrine requirement from their regulations. 
Dingell proposed legislation to keep it which passed but was 
subsequently vetoed by President Reagan. He had his propos­
al attached to the budget bill a year later, but it was
64Duncan, 768.
65Ibid, 768.
66Rogers, 1.
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dropped in a final attempt to get the legislation through.
Dingell's personal interest in his oversight subcommit­
tee is readily observable. He attended all but two of the 
24 separate hearings covered under this research, for a 99% 
attendance record overall. The two hearings he missed were 
two short and fairly unimportant generic drug hearings. A 
brief description of his participation in each case follows.
Generic Drug Investigation
Although the impetus for the probe into the generic 
drug approval process originated with staff members, Dingell 
quickly became enthusiastic about the investigation as 
convincing evidence appeared regarding the magnitude of 
abuses within the FDA. His involvement deepened as it 
became obvious that the scandal extended far beyond the 
approval stage alone and the generic drug industry manufac­
turing practices came under suspicion. He took an active 
role in prompting criminal proceedings against FDA and 
industry officials and quickly became the target of angry 
newspaper advertisements sponsored by a company under suspi­
cion. He angrily demanded the names of FDA employees who 
ordered a surprise inspection of Barr Laboratories shortly 
after its president testified that it had also suffered 
discriminatory treatment during the approval process. The 
inspection was canceled (with appropriate apologies).
Acknowledging that under current law, the FDA did not 
have the authority to penalize companies which engaged in
72
questionable activities, Dingell recognized that the FDA 
would need "a sharp new set of enforcement teeth" to "put 
misery on the scoundrels who are doing these things."67 
His emphasis during the course of the investigation shifted 
noticeably from oversight of the FDA to legislative remedies 
to address the problem.
Scientific Misconduct
According to staff members, Dingell did not foresee the 
furor wh'ich would erupt over the Cell paper, did not antici­
pate that it would require a second hearing, and
...took a lot of heat for it as Baltimore rallied the 
scientific community and launched a direct attack at 
Dingell and the right of the government to become 
involved in scientific issues.
While Baltimore complained that he was being "hounded" 
by Dingell and NIH investigators Stewart and Feder, many 
scientists considered the case as an attack on science 
itself. A Baltimore colleague launched a nation-wide cam­
paign to enlist the support of the scientific community to 
get Dingell to back down. In a "Dear Colleague" letter, MIT 
scientist Phillip Sharp asked researchers to help "in coun­
tering the continuing activities of Rep. John Dingell's 
subcommittee in Congress.1,68 The letter urged scientists 
to write to every member of the subcommittee, particularly
67John Cary, "Congress Wants a Tougher FDA— But It's Not 
Sure How Tough," Business Week. (January 14, 1991), 33.
68Barbara J. Culliton, "Dingell v. Baltimore," Science 
244. 28 April 1989, 414.
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minority Republicans, in the hope that fellow congressmen 
could stop the subcommittee which had "repeatedly rejected 
the judgment of qualified scientists" that no fraud was 
involved and had embarked on "a vendetta against honest 
scientists" that would "cost our society dearly." Dingell's 
response to criticism from the academic and scientific press
describing his subcommittee as "science police" was to
request the assignment of Walter Stewart, Baltimore's pro­
tagonist at NIH, to his subcommittee and to’call in the 
Secret Service to check the validity of Dr. Imanishi-Kari's 
journal entries, an action Baltimore predicted would have a 
"chilling effect" on the scientific process.69
The most volatile point during the investigation came 
on May 4, 1989, when Baltimore appeared before the committee 
in a grueling day of testimony which lasted until nearly 7 
p.m. A large audience of scientists witnessed the indignant 
Nobel prize winner lecture the subcommittee on the scientif­
ic process, question Dingell's motives, and defend his co­
authors from what he termed the relentless pursuit of an 
interventionist Congress. Newspapers and the scientific 
press portrayed the event as a personal duel between two 
protagonists, announced that Baltimore had emerged as the 
victor, and concluded that Dingell had uncharacteristically 
botched the hearing.
Even when he was clearly on the defensive, Dingell
69David Baltimore, "Self Regulation of Science," Technolo­
gy Review 6, August, 1989, 20.
74
refused to back down. Although the investigation raised 
questions of abuse of power by his subcommittee and Dingell 
and his staff were subjected to extensive criticism, partic­
ularly from the scientific press, he continued to express 
reservations about the ability of the scientific community 
to police itself and unqualified support for his staff.
Mediaap Insurance
Chairman Dingell's interest in the insurance industry
i
in general and in insurance matters affecting the elderly in 
particular are widely known. The hearing was clearly di­
rected at calling attention to sales abuses of questionable 
insurance policies to gullible senior citizens. The goal 
was to gain support for potential legislation which would 
allow the federal government to set regulations to govern 
this type of insurance coverage.
Since individual states, not the federal government, 
supplied what little regulation existed in this area at the 
time the hearing was held in 1989, the hearing cannot be 
considered traditional oversight since no federal agency was 
involved. Dingell was clearly using this forum to promote 
his own policy agenda.
An interesting point is that Dingell selected a member 
of his full committee staff to conduct the investigation 
rather than assigning (or suggesting) it to a member of the 
subcommittee investigative staff. This is another indica­
tion that Dingell was concerned with affecting policy, not
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conducting the type of investigation his subcommittee is 
usually associated with. The staff member I interviewed 
frankly admitted that his and Dingell*s intention was to 
create a record of the problem in the hope that it prompted 
legislators to take the necessary action.
Regulation of the Medigap insurance industry is a 
politically astute move which would undoubtedly appeal to 
the influential senior citizen bloc at no cost to the feder­
al government (or the deficit). The hearing was calculated 
to draw attention to the problem, increase support for 
potential legislation, and dampen opposition expected to 
come not from the Republicans in Congress or the White House 
but from the insurance industry itself.70
Blood Supply Safety
By the time the staff member who initiated the investi­
gation into the nation's blood supply approached Chairman 
Dingell with the need to hold a hearing on the issue, he 
already knew that the focus of the investigation would be on 
the blood industry, not the FDA, and that much of the criti­
cism for laxity in standards was going to be directed at the 
American Red Cross. Hesitant to proceed further without 
discussing possible negative ramifications of attacking a 
revered institution with powerful supporters, he wanted to
70Dingell lost in the short run but won in the end. 
Legislation he co-sponsored with Wyden shortly after the 
hearing was lobbied down by the insurance industry but later 
passed as part of the budget reconciliation bill in 1990.
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be sure that Dingell was aware of the implications of the
investigations and supported it. He described the first
time he discussed the investigation with the chairman:
Funny; he usually goes at about 110 miles per hour.
When I first told him about the blood investigation, I 
warned him that we were going to investigate the Ameri­
can Red Cross. He stared at me for about five seconds 
and said, "Ok, do it the right way. Keep me informed.
Testimony revealed numerous problems with the American 
Red Cross record-keeping system and its failure to notify 
the FDA ,of potentially fatal collection and’ distribution 
errors. In contrast to the openly adversarial climate of 
the generic drug probe, however, the blood investigation was 
handled with a great deal of discretion and tact, largely 
because of the potential for widespread public panic if 
abuses in the collection and processing of this vital com­
modity became widely known and partly because the attitude 
of the organization's top administration was cooperative 
from the beginning.
Dingell was apparently satisfied that any problems 
would be corrected by the Red Cross and saw no point in 
applying additional pressure to attracting further attention 
once the organization agreed to tighten their restrictions.
Ozone Laver Depletion
Hearings into the effect of the international Montreal 
Protocol on the banning of substances which affect the ozone 
layer merged two issues of great concern to Dingell: the 
environment and American competitiveness in the world mar­
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ket. Like the investigations into the Medigap insurance 
industry, he used a staff member from the full committee 
rather than a member of the subcommittee investigative staff 
to handle the proceedings. This staffer was described by an 
individual on a subcommittee memberfs staff as someone whose 
views regarding the environment were identical to Dingell's.
The purpose of the hearing seems to be similar to that 
of the Medigap hearing, except that the pressure in this 
case was clearly directed at the administration and the EPA. 
Dingell's concern was apparently that environmental concerns 
were receiving more priority than the country's competitive 
trade position. He was particularly concerned with the 
effect of the Protocol on small to mid-sized businesses and 
insuring that they received as much assistance as possible 
during the transition from banned substances to acceptable 
substitutes.
Medical Devices Industry
This investigation is a classic example of the type of 
high-profile issue which adds to Dingell's stature without 
much involvement on his part before it reaches the hearing 
stage. The issue received a lot of attention not only 
because of the number of patients who had received the heart 
valves which were the focus of the investigation (approxi­
mately 86,000) and the relatively high rate of failure, but 
also because of the potential legal cost to Pfizer in damage
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suits.71 Lawyers, doctors, the medical equipment industry, 
and heart patients followed the proceedings with interest.
The staff member assigned to the case called it a 
"great consumer issue" which generated a great deal of 
interest, especially once the report became public and after 
the California court ruling on the case. She said that at 
one point, the CEO of Pfizer met with Dingell to try to get 
him to "soft pedal" the issue but that Dingell arranged for 
her to attend the meeting and didn't attempt to "back door" 
her. She said that Dingell listened to Pfizer's arguments 
but didn't relax the pressure.
She indicated that Dingell did not play a very promi­
nent role in the investigation and allowed Wyden to direct 
most of the questioning during the hearing. However, she 
said that Dingell was "pleased...(he) thought it was a great 
hearing (which) served the purpose." Curiously, although 
Wyden was appointed to the conference committee to reconcile 
the House and Senate versions of the bill which resulted, he 
was not listed as one of the bill's sponsors.72
Of the cases I studied, this one was the most blatantly
71As of April 1990, Pfizer had settled approximately 200 
claims for damages, all of them out of court, for amounts 
reportedly as high as $1 million. In January, 1990, a Califor­
nia appellate court ruled that a 39-year old patient could be 
compensated for "mental anguish" if she and her lawyers can 
prove that the manufacturer fraudulently misled the public 
about the valve's risks. This ruling opens the door for the 
56,000 implant recipients currently wearing the valve to sue 
even if their devices function normally.
72The bill was sponsored by Dingell and Sikorski. 
Sikorski did not attend the hearing.
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partisan, with Republican members expressing sympathy for 
manufacturers of medical equipment for use in high-risk 
patients but also attacking the manner in which the compan­
ion report, "The Bjork-Shiley Heart Valve: Earn As You 
Learn," was prepared and submitted. Additional details are 
provided in Chapter VI.
Army Helicopter Procurement
Dingell has a long-standing interest in exposing de-
i
fense industry abuses which has earned him a reputation as a 
turf-stealer and provoked hostility from his peers in Con­
gress, particularly Les Aspin of the House Armed Services 
Committee. Although the quasi-official justification for 
usurping the oversight of defense contractors is that they 
are regulated by the SEC which Energy and Cdmmerce does have 
jurisdiction over, the actual reason for the subcommittee's 
activities appears to be that it regards Armed Services as 
tied too closely to defense manufacturers and unwilling to 
exert any controls over them. The mantle thus falls (so the 
logic goes) by default to the only subcommittee in Congress 
willing to tackle the powerful on behalf of the public.
The focus of these particular defense hearings was 
divided about equally between charges that the Army had 
grossly underestimated what it took to maintain sophisticat­
ed military equipment it had purchased and criticism of the 
manufacturer for failing to correct defective designs or 
supply appropriate parts. Dingell took an obvious interest
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in the progress of the investigations and was, the staff 
members involved in them indicate, supportive as always.
After the close of the hearings, Dingell publicly 
criticized the Army's plans to buy another $1.5 billion 
worth of helicopters remaining on the contract and circulat­
ed a copy of a letter he had addressed to Defense Secretary 
Dick Cheney advising against the purchase.
Unfair Trade Practices
Dingell's reputation as a protectionist is, in large
measure, based on the needs of his Detroit constituents.
Opposed to deregulation, he believes the government should
protect the public against the abuses of the free market.
He seems to instinctively distrust corporations and has
focused much of his anger on Wall Street and- the defense
industries. He is alarmed about the size of the US trade
deficit and a vocal critic of President Reagan's "coddling
of the Japanese" yet he bristles at the charges that he
supports a return to Smoot-Hawley protectionism. Instead,
he advocates reciprocal trade agreements:
I didn't make this jungle. We just live here. And we 
can't practice some polite rules that none of the other 
predatory animals in this jungle are going to live by. 
We have got to live by the rules that are here, and 
there is no way that America is going to survive, or 
American industry, or opportunities for our kids are 
going to survive, if this is the only free trade coun­
try in the world and everybody else practices restric­
tive trade.73
^Thomas G. Donlan, "The Samurai Warrior from Michigan," 
Barron's. (April 15, 1985), 26.
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Despite disagreements with other committees and subcom­
mittees over jurisdiction over trade issues, Dingell has 
made it clear that he considers these matters his domain and 
has used his subcommittee to hold hearings on trade issues 
throughout the eighties. The purpose of the hearings held 
during this Congress was to examine recent landmark trade 
legislation to see whether it was being enforced and having 
the desired effect, as well as to influence the direction of 
the GATT) negotiations expected to resume in'the future.
The hearings were structured to provide a forum for 
numerous industries to call attention to problems they were 
encountering in gaining access to global markets. Their 
testimony reinforced Dingell's argument that American compa­
nies are at a competitive trade disadvantage and that mea­
sures need to be adopted to counteract unfair tactics used 
by other nations to protect their own industries.
Summary
Dingell's political interests clearly dominate the 
subcommittee agenda. Environmental, trade, health, and 
consumer issues are high on his list of priorities and on 
his oversight calendar. Although staff members claim that 
Dingell allows wide latitude in selection of topics for 
investigation, they tend to gravitate towards areas in which 
the chairman has an interest. Occasional deviation from 
this pattern, however, such as the scientific misconduct 
investigation, reinforce Dingell's reputation as an aggres-
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sive opponent of waste and corruption and deflect criticism 
of his subcommittee for focusing its attention exclusively 
on issues of personal interest to the chairman. Highly 
publicized cases of this nature tend to originate with the 
staff; the amount of attention devoted to these issues may 
be tolerated because they are viewed as part of an overall 
strategy to enhance the reputation of the subcommittee and 
not necessarily for their value in correcting problems in 
administrative agencies.
CHAPTER V 
SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBER PARTICIPATION74
Staff members interviewed indicated that in most in­
stances, subcommittee members had very little involvement in 
probes during the investigatory stage. They indicated that 
although congressmen and their personal staff were generally
i
informed about the progress of investigations, in most
instances they were seldom aware of specific details until
they were briefed shortly before hearings. In general,
staff members tended to regard subcommittee members as the
audience for hearings, rather than active participants.
Some hearings appear to be deliberately orchestrated not
only to attract attention of the media and the public, but
the subcommittee members as well. One staff member described
the effect of hearings on members:
We don't get many surprises during the hearings. We 
know what the witnesses are going to say and we already 
have prepared the responses the members come back with. 
Often the members are surprised, though, and sometimes 
the best way to get a point across is to make them sit 
there and listen to it firsthand. It's much more 
effective than writing a report.
Another said that he considers the hearing as "an education­
al tool" not only for the agency but for the members. One
74See Appendix D for a complete list of members of the 
subcommittee during the 101st Congress.
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staff member called the hearings "theatrical productions" 
and said that witnesses may be called for their potential 
"emotional impact". For example, during the medical device 
hearing,
We brought in one witness I knew would cry during the 
hearing. His wife had died from a faulty heart valve 
and he cried during the preliminary interview. This 
was really risky. Dingell hates tears and Mike (the 
staff director) thought I shouldn't do it. I thought 
it was too good to pass up so I did it anyway. About 
halfway through his testimony, the witness started to 
cry and I looked at Mike and he was looking at Dingell 
and looked worried. A little later, he looked at me 
and smiled so I knew it was OK.
Although staff members carefully avoid directly criti­
cizing subcommittee members, it is clear that they consider 
them tools to be manipulated during the oversight process 
rather than full partners. Because members seldom take any 
initiative in requesting investigation into ‘particular 
topics, staff members apparently assume that their commit­
ment to oversight is merely superficial or political in 
nature. Their allegiance is clearly to Dingell, viewed as a 
distinctive breed not only because he is chairman but be­
cause they presumably share a similar philosophy with regard 
to the importance of oversight in the political process.
It is difficult to determine whether Dingell takes member 
preferences into consideration when setting his own over­
sight agenda, although it is reasonable to assume that 
members who have particular interests may channel them 
through the chairman rather than approach subcommittee 
staffers directly.
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Variance in Participation-Individual and Party Affiliation
Overall, participation in subcommittee hearing was much 
higher among Republicans than Democrats. As shown in Table 
3, in fifteen hearings, Republican attendance (as a percent
TABLE 3
ATTENDANCE AT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS (BY PARTY AFFILIATION)
% of subcommittee members
# of # of 
RHearing D
Generic drugs
5/10/89 3
5/11/8,9 3
7/11/89 6
7/27/89 3
9/11/89 3
11/17/89 5
6/20/90 4
10/15/90 1
12/19/90 2
12/20/90 1
Scientific Fraud
5/04/89 5
5/09/90 2
4/30/90 2
5/14/90 2
Medigap Insurance
4/26/89 4
Ozone Layer
5/15/89 1
Medical Devices
2/26/90 3
Army Helicopters
4/19/90 3
5/10/90 3
Blood Supply Safety
7/13/90 4
Unfair Trade Practices
3/01/89 5
3/02/89 7
7/30/90 2
9/24/90 2
in attendance (by party) 
Democrats Republicans
37.5J
37.52
75.02
37.52
37.52
6 2 . 5 2
50.02
12.52
2 5 . 0 2
1 2 . 5 2
62.5% 
25.0% 
25.0% 
25. 0%
50.02
1 2 . 5 2
37.52
37.52
37.52
50.02
6 2 . 5 2
87.52
2 5 . 0 2
2 5 . 0 2
40.0% 
60.0% 
80.0% 
60.0% 
40.0% 
80.0% 
80. 0% 
40.0% 
20.0% 
0.0%
60. 0% 
60.0% 
0 .0% 
0 .0%
40.02
20.0%
80.0%
40.0%
60.0%
60.02
80.0%
80.0%
0.0%
20.0%
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of total party membership on the subcommittee) was greater 
than that of the majority party.75 All five minority mem­
bers were very interested in the generic drug hearings and 
attended regularly.
In most other cases, attendance varied depending on the 
issue, except for Bliley and McMillan who seemed involved in 
just about all of them.
Attendance at the subcommittee hearings for each of the 
eight cases under examination are shown in tables 4 and 5. 
Table 4 indicates the number of hearings on each issue con­
ducted during the 101st Congress and the total number of 
hearing hours devoted to each issue. Table 5 measures the 
percentage of attendance for each member at the hearings on 
each of the eight issues. As can be seen, there is a wide 
divergence in hearing attendance among members of the sub­
committee, and a noticeable difference between participation 
by Democrats and Republicans.
Rep. Bliley, the ranking Republican on the subcommit­
tee, seldom misses a hearing. He attended at least one on 
every single issue I studied; his attendance rate was 81.6%, 
second only to Dingell's. Although subcommittee staffers 
generally describe him as cooperative, it is unclear whether 
he attends hearings because he is interested (and support­
ive) or whether he considers it his responsibility to over
75Democratic participation, as a percentage of total 
subcommittee membership by party affiliation, was greater in 
nine of the hearings.
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see the overseers. Minority staff members insisted, of 
course, that his participation stemmed from a genuine com­
mitment to oversight and the work of the subcommittee.
The lack of Democratic attendance as a general rule is 
somewhat puzzling. Despite the considerable publicity 
associated with most subcommittee hearings and the signifi­
cant political benefits which would presumably accrue from 
visible participation, interest appeared to be aligned with 
constituent concerns. This could be expected in relation 
to routine committee hearings but was somewhat surprising on 
an oversight subcommittee with excellent opportunities for 
favorable media attention and the potential to earn (or 
enhance) a reputation as a congressional watchdog.
The issues which sparked the most interest among sub­
committee Democrats were generic drugs (and three Democrats 
never attended ANY hearings on that issue) and unfair trade 
practices, which provided a convenient forum for congressmen 
to gripe at Trade Representative Hills and Commerce Secre­
tary Mossbacher about how our trade policies were hurting 
industries in their home states.
Subcommittee staffers singled out a few individuals for 
their interest in the issues I studied. Almost all of them 
mentioned Rep. Ron Wyden (D-OR), a former leader of the Gray 
Panthers, who appears to share Dingell's interest in most 
issues, except environmental protection. He appeared to be 
actively involved in at least four of the issues (medical 
devices, blood supply safety, Medigap insurance, and generic
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drugs), which reflects his concern about issues which affect 
the elderly. Wyden's attendance record (76.8%) for hearings 
is higher than other Democrats, except for Dingell overall 
and Walgren (for the first session); he attended at least 
one hearing on each of the issues, with the exception of the 
one on the ozone layer. Whenever Dingell is forced to leave 
the hearing room for any reason, Wyden substitutes for him 
as chairman. He is a frequent spokesman in the press, 
particularly on health-related issues.
Participation among other Democrats on the issues I 
studied, however, ranged from Walgren's 78.8% to no partici­
pation at all (Cooper). Walgren's activity level was proba­
bly affected by his acute interest in trade issues, specifi­
cally those affecting the steel industry in his home dis­
trict, and the fact that his district in Pittsburgh is the 
home of Mylan Laboratories, the whistleblower whose initial 
complaint triggered the generic drug investigation. The 
issue received a lot of publicity in Pennsylvania and it 
would have been politically foolish for Walgren not to 
maximize his role in the probe for the hometown press. His 
participation was probably also influenced by his chairman­
ship of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection 
and Competitiveness, which would have a logical interest in 
many of the issues which came to the hearing stage during 
his tenure on the subcommittee.
Eckhart (who has been called a "Dingell in training" by 
the press) also seems to be substantially more interested in
91
oversight issues than most of his Democratic colleagues, 
even actively participating in the hearing on medical devic­
es when he was no longer a member of the subcommittee during 
the session in which the hearing was held. Other Democrats, 
however, did not express much interest in these particular 
issues. Of the three Democrats who were members of the 
subcommittee for the entire two years, Sikorski had the best 
attendance record, attending hearings on four of the eight 
issues. , Collins managed to appear only during the hearing 
on blood safety, and Bryant attended only two hearings on 
unfair trade practices. Boucher attended hearings on only 
two of the five issues active during his service on the 
subcommittee, while Schuer attended only the trade hearings 
and Cooper none at all during the session he was a member.
Variance in Attendance by Issue
Examination of the data on attendance during hearings 
reveals a wide variation in interest displayed by the mem­
bers by issue, particularly among committee Democrats. The 
generic drug hearings, because they involved a highly-publi­
cized scandal on a subject of great interest to many con­
stituent groups, generated substantial member interest.
One staffer on the scientific fraud investigation 
contended that subcommittee members provided very little 
support during the controversy; instead, he said they 
"strayed like roaches in the sunlight." He recalled that 
few of them bothered to show up for the first hearing (in
1988) and even those who did were not overly enthusiastic. 
This lukewarm reception may have stemmed from a sense that 
there was little political advantage to be gained from an 
attack on the integrity of the scientific community, but 
conversations from congressional staff indicate that there 
was a strong feeling that the subcommittee staff had overex­
tended itself on this particular battle. Regardless of 
their feelings about the investigation, however, a respect­
able number of members did attend the hearings held during 
this congress. The three Republicans who attended the 
hearings, in particular, were certainly not disinterested, 
spending nearly 14 hours each listening to testimony from 
Drs. O'Toole, Imanishi-Kari and Baltimore.
However, most Democrats appeared apathetic about the 
medical device and army procurement hearings, and neither 
party (with the exception of Dingell and Bliley) showed any 
interest whatsoever in the environmental issue.
The staff member who handled the trade investigation 
indicated that those hearings deliberately focused on 
"things that tied to a member's district" to give everyone 
on the subcommittee a personal (and political) stake in the 
proceedings. Witnesses in the private sector representing 
the telecommunications, pharmaceutical, steel, motion 
picture and auto parts industries testified that the Act had 
failed to open new international markets to American prod­
ucts and that intellectual property rights violations had 
weakened the U.S. competitive position. Sikorski (Minneso-
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ta), Oxley (Ohio), Bryant (Texas), and McMillan (North 
Carolina) were concerned about trade policies which affected 
the semiconductor and supercomputer industries in their home 
districts. Bliley (Virginia) criticized Thailand and the 
People*s Republic of China for banning the importation of 
American tobacco products. Walgren (Pennsylvania) and 
Eckart (Ohio) wanted extensions of the Voluntary Restraint 
Agreements to help protect the steel industry in their 
districts; Eckart also wanted a change in policies to bene­
fit the auto parts industry which is rapidly becoming a 
significant part of Ohio's manufacturing base. Even Wyden, 
who usually calls himself "the last of the free traders," 
expressed dissatisfaction with the recent free trade agree­
ment with Canada which he said had negative repercussions on 
Oregon's wine and timber industries. McMillan's primary 
concern was the American position on trade policies affect­
ing the textile industry, in particular the multi-fiber 
agreements which are on the agenda for discussion during the 
GATT negotiations.
On the other hand, Rep. Lent of New York was concerned 
that sanctions against Japan for protectionist policies 
would backfire against the aerospace contractors in his 
district whose finished products incorporated semiconductors 
and other parts manufactured overseas.
The significant level of interest in the trade issue 
lends credence to the argument that Congressmen, even Con­
gressmen on this renowned oversight subcommittee, prefer to
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spend their efforts on activities which will pay off in 
terms of constituent support. The trade hearings were not 
so much an effort to determine whether administrative agen­
cies were carrying out the terms of recent trade legislation 
as an opportunity to affect national trade policy and push 
for increased protectionism for U.S. companies.
Summary
In summary, where political incentives for participa-
I
tion in oversight hearings were present, participation among 
subcommittee members increased. If no significant political 
link could be determined, this was reflected in a drop in 
attendance at hearings. However, there appeared to be no 
clear pattern of participation which resulted from a desire 
to perform oversight of the bureaucracy in a traditional 
sense. Instead, subcommittee member interest seemed to 
result more from constituent concerns.
Surprisingly, participation across the spectrum of the 
issues under investigation was consistently higher among 
Republican members of the subcommittee, whose overall rate 
of participation was markedly greater at 56% than was that 
of the Democrats (30%).
CHAPTER VI
PARTISANSHIP AND MINORITY INVOLVEMENT
In response to questions about participation by minori­
ty subcommittee members, most staff members insist that 
oversight investigations are largely bipartisan and do not 
become the focus of political rivalries. One staff member 
described the political atmosphere on the subcommittee as:
...very nonpartisan. All politicians run against 
fraud, waste and abuse. Most members don't want to get 
in the way of this train. We work well with the Repub­
licans on most issues.
Barrett said that Dingell was more concerned with
competition between branches than with party rivalry.
Being a creature of the House, Dingell regards ANY 
administration as the enemy. He believes completely in 
the idea of checks and balances. He certainly showed 
no hesitation in attacking the last Democratic presi­
dent (Carter) when he felt he deserved it.
Dingell has often insisted that oversight should be
above partisan politics:
We have gone after Democratic administrations and 
Republican...we have gone after Democratic appointees 
and Republican. We have made misery for Democratic- 
controlled agencies in government and regulatory agen­
cies appointed by Democratic administrations, and we 
have done the same thing to Republicans. We are quite 
indifferent about that. The law is the law, and we are 
here to see that it will be carried out.76
76Donlan, 28.
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On a practical basis, the current staff director speculated 
that the absence of partisan tension is strategically advan­
tageous.
If our investigations were reduced to partisan issues, 
we would be constantly trading political shots. That 
would slow us down and render us ineffective. The 
investigations are strictly fact-driven, not political.
These observations were verified in interviews with
minority staff members, one of whom commented that:
Investigations certainly don't appear to be partisan in 
geperal. We all work together; there are really few, if 
any partisan issues that I am aware of. I think there 
was a time when it was more partisan but that was 
before I got here. I work well with majority staff; 
the only problems I have are due to communications 
breakdowns and that isn't really their fault. You are 
involved from the beginning. It varies from person to 
person, but once you are trusted, they bring you on 
board real quick.
Nevertheless, despite frequent assurances from Dingell,
subcommittee members and staff that oversight investigations
are not motivated by partisanship or designed to embarrass a
Republican president, at least one minority staff member has
expressed some reservations on this point:
...with a Republican administration to shoot at 
(Dingell) hasn't been as willing to see things from an 
executive point of view. If there were a Democratic 
president or if he were a Republican, there would be a 
tendency to step back and do less administration bash­
ing.
However, this same staff member conceded that, given
Dingell's devotion to exposing misconduct and problems in
the agencies,
...if there were a Democratic administration, (the 
subcommittee) would be just as busy and the battles 
might be even more bitter...the rivalry between Dingell 
and Waxman would probably be even more pronounced.
Another minority staff member supported this position, 
commenting that he saw the rivalries on the committee less 
as partisan disputes than as contests between subcommittees 
and dominant personalities among the Democrats. However, 
should the Democrats regain the White House and still manage 
to maintain control of both houses of Congress, it is rea­
sonable to assume that a resurgence in party discipline 
would occur which would discourage this type of behavior 
among congressional Democrats. In any event, Dingell's 
subcommittee would not be immune to partisan pressure from 
the executive branch and House leaders. It is therefore 
dangerous to assume that partisan politics plays only a 
minor role in this subcommittee's investigations despite 
sanctimonious assurances to the contrary.
However, in line with the current official benevolent 
attitude adopted with regard to repressed partisan tension 
during investigations, subcommittee staffers tended to 
describe Republican members in complementary terms, as 
"sage", "well intentioned", "sincere" and "supportive".
They appeared to be especially fond of Rep. Thomas Bliley
*51
(R-VA), the ranking Republican on the subcommittee for his 
cooperation and willingness to put partisan politics aside 
in the interest of conducting "honest" oversight.
A legislative aide to a subcommittee member presented a 
collaborating, if somewhat more politically realistic, 
explanation. She commented that Republicans like the pub­
licity that normally results from the hearings and tend to
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downplay partisan differences during the investigatory 
stage. There are political incentives to be gained from 
appearing to watchdog federal agencies or attacking indus­
tries which misuse government funds, particularly if criti­
cism is not directed toward their party and administration. 
It is a different story, the aide commented, if the hearings 
result in the introduction of legislation opposed by the 
President or party leaders.
They're with you until legislation is proposed and the 
administration doesn't support it. All of a sudden, 
they're out of the picture.
The political angle was also mentioned by subcommittee 
staff members who seem aware that they can count on minority 
cooperation during investigations, but are apparently less 
confident that this will translate into support for a legis­
lative solution. It may be a significant factor in the 
cynical attitude most of them hold toward corrective legis­
lative. In general, staff members tend to dismiss legisla­
tive solutions to correct embedded problems within the 
government because bills get "bogged down in politics", 
preferring instead to
...expose what's going on. We create pressure. Someone 
is awakened to do the right thing, or maybe pressured 
to do the right thing.
In contrast to the subcommittee's efforts under Chair­
man Moss which attempted to influence pending legislation or 
the introduction of new measures, most staff members were 
more concerned with applying pressure on administrative 
agencies to implement existing regulations. Staff comments
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with regard to additional legislation were blunt and pessi­
mistic:
There is already more than enough legislation out 
there. Our job is to keep the pressure on to implement 
it as toughly as they should.
Legislation can't fix anything. Politics comes out.
If we can manage to get something through the House, it 
gets stuck in the Senate.
What we do here is not legislation driven. Possibili­
ties of legislative change are encompassed, of course, 
but we don't focus on it. You can spotlight where 
changes are needed and hope that the agency makes them 
or appropriate action results from exposure.
However, it was less clear that this bias is shared by the
subcommittee chairman.
One major problem for minority members is that they
have no real control over the agenda. Although there appear
to be no barriers preventing Republicans from requesting an
investigation, this does not seem to be a common occurrence.
Subcommittee staffers indicate a willingness to conduct
investigations upon request from members of either party,
but emphasize that most investigations result from staff
initiative. A minority staff member could recall only one
issue which was minority-driven (Telestar). Republican
members can also utilize the General Accounting Office and
can request an investigation on any subject which interest
them. There was no problem with access to the GAO a few
years ago when a minority member requested a independent
study on railroad retirement plans; he quickly obtained GAO
assistance in compiling the information he needed. As
Dingell appears to take a conciliatory position with regard
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to his minority members and often proposes legislation with 
both Democratic and Republican sponsors, there does not 
appear to be much incentive for partisan competition.
In spite of Dingell's continued insistence that there 
is no "majority staff, only subcommittee staff", the minori­
ty staff suffer obvious disadvantages in comparison with the 
staff which reports to Dingell and his fellow Democrats. 
First, there are only 22 of them, and they must serve the 
entire full committee. In contrast, there are currently 14 0 
"majority" staff on the full committee, most of them as­
signed to specific subcommittees. There are, therefore, 
almost as many full-time investigators assigned to this one 
subcommittee as there are minority staff who work for the 
entire full committee.
In addition, it is far easier for "majority" staff 
members to focus on narrow interests and develop a level of 
expertise which minority staff, far outnumbered and shuffled 
between subcommittees, are seldom able to obtain. Further, 
the chain of command for subcommittee (majority) staff is 
very clear: first Dingell, then the other Democratic subcom­
mittee members. If involved with an oversight and investi­
gations subcommittee probe, a minority staff member must 
answer equally to all four minority members on the subcom­
mittee and secondly to all Republicans on the full committee 
who might have questions or concerns.
Most subcommittee staffers appeared to make a consci­
entious effort to include minority staff in all aspects of
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the investigation. Staff members claimed that minority 
staff was "100% involved", or "involved from the beginning 
stages" and the investigations were "absolutely nonparti­
san" .
None of the minority staff members I interviewed com­
plained of unfair treatment by the subcommittee members or 
staff, but all of them mentioned structural difficulties and 
time constraints which hindered their effectiveness. Most 
complaints from minority staff members center on scheduling 
conflicts and the inability to focus on only one issue at a 
time, neither of which they blame on the subcommittee staff. 
Involved with several investigations simultaneously, they 
often face painful choices when hearings or interviews for 
different cases are scheduled simultaneously. The minority 
staff do not appear to blame subcommittee staff for these 
difficulties, as one aide commented:
It's not their fault. We're stretched pretty thin. 
Oversight and Investigations is a very active subcom­
mittee and the staff is aggressively involved in a 
number of issues all the time. They try their best to 
keep us informed on everything, but we can't always 
keep up.
In most investigations, minority staff say that they 
are treated as "equal partners" in the investigations, 
although some hearings involve separate minority efforts. 
Minority staffers say they are usually given more than the 
required seven days notice about a scheduled hearing and 
receive adequate time to review materials. Long-time minor­
ity staffers commented that their relations with the "major-
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ity" staff had vastly improved under Barrett's tenure, and 
they expected this to continue under the new staff director, 
Reid Stuntz. Both men, they indicated, made a conscientious 
effort to keep them informed.
However, in three of the investigations (Medigap insur­
ance, scientific misconduct, and medical devices) there 
appeared to be indications of partisan tension. Therefore, 
the assertion that partisan politics plays a minimal role in 
subcommittee investigations could be challenged in half of 
the cases I examined.
Generic Drug Approval Process
Republican support for the probe was strong from its 
inception, particularly from Bliley, who later co-sponsored 
(with Dingell) legislation designed to prevent similar 
problems from occurring again in the future. Republican 
support for the investigation remained solid throughout the 
ordeal in spite of strong lobbying efforts by the pharmaceu­
tical industry. It is particularly striking that Rep. Lent, 
who represents a state (New York) which is the home of many 
of the generic drug firms under investigation, continued to 
wholeheartedly agree with efforts to correct abuses in the 
industry, despite layoffs of hundreds of innocent employees 
as the investigation proceeded.
During the stormiest moments of the investigation, when 
Bolar Pharmaceutical Company took out full-page newspaper 
ads blasting Dingell and his staff for "creating a climate
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of fear in the generic drug industry,"77 it was the minori­
ty members who reacted with the greatest outrage.
There was some concern expressed within Congress (but 
not the subcommittee) that the generic drug industry was 
being unfairly singled out for publicity because problems 
uncovered with generic drug approvals existed throughout the 
FDA. Some members complained that Dingell's investigation 
and his proposed solutions were "overly heavy-handed and 
could work against restoring confidence in generic 
drugs."78 The fact that criticism of this type did not 
apparently surface among Republican members of the subcom­
mittee may be connected to a remedy proposed by Bliley (and 
supported by President Bush) allowing the FDA to charge drug 
companies user fees to review and process applications. In 
the past, this idea had been backed by the administration 
and Republican legislators but defeated by Democrats. 
Minority support for the investigation may have, therefore, 
may have masked a hidden agenda, which definitely had parti­
san overtones.
Scientific Misconduct
During the widely-publicized and emotional hearings on 
the Baltimore cell paper, one Republican member was very 
critical of the investigation and fought it until the draft
77Rogers, 1.
78Julie Kosterlitz, "Drug Therapy," National Journal. May 
25, 1991, 1233.
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of the NIH report was released. According to a minority 
staff member, although some majority members were fairly 
convinced that the subcommittee staff had done an adequate 
job, most minority members were more skeptical and none of 
them showed up for the initial hearing in April of 1988.
By 1989, however, the majority of Republicans on the subcom­
mittee were actively involved in the investigation.
The "Dear Colleague" letter campaign instigated by an 
MIT scientist may have produced the desired'results with 
minority subcommittee members. In his opening statement at 
the May 4th hearing, Rep. Norman Lent urged his colleagues 
to approach the day's testimony with caution. Rep. Alex 
McMillan wondered aloud whether "anyone had ever examined 
the notebooks of Albert Einstein."
Subcommittee staffers attribute the lack of support 
among Republicans members to the controversial nature of the 
investigations. With the hearings receiving vehement criti­
cism from the scientific community and the press, there was 
no political incentive to be associated with what was gener­
ally perceived to be a misguided attempt to regulate the 
scientific profession. Several Democratic members of the 
subcommittee also distanced themselves from the inquiry but 
were more hesitant in voicing their objections.
Medigap Insurance
During the Medigap insurance investigations, minority 
members were portrayed by staff as being generally more
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sympathetic to the insurance industry, but not generally in 
a position to obstruct the investigation. In contrast to 
the abuses which were being charged by the majority, in his 
opening statement, Bliley remarked that problems with 
Medigap policies had decreased during the eighties and 
expressed his reservations that no representation from the 
insurance industry had been invited to testify before the 
subcommittee. McMillan also indicated that he felt the 
insurance companies were, in general, behaving responsibly 
in trying to protect consumers from unscrupulous agents and 
that the blame should be placed on state regulators not the 
insurance industry.
Medical Devices
The most partisan issue I investigated -was clearly the
medical devices hearing. There appear to have been two
dimensions to the tensions which surfaced during the course
of the hearing. First, the Republicans expressed sympathy
for the manufacturers of "high risk" medical equipment, and
secondly, there was an uncharacteristic lack of cooperation
between subcommittee and minority staff. In his opening
statement, normally cooperative Congressman Bliley expressed
reservations about the hearing and its accompanying report:
In this case, we seem to be approaching a fine line 
that separates FDA oversight of medical devices from 
practicing medicine. I am not a doctor, I have not 
been trained in medicine, and I am patently unqualified 
form rendering medical opinions. I believe the same 
applies to the individuals who prepared the report 
being issued today. Yet this report appears to analyze 
and interpret medical phenomena, question the findings
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of scientific experts, and make medical judgements that 
the subcommittee and its staff have just no business 
making.
He also complained that minority staff members had not 
participated in the preparation of the report and were given 
insufficient time to review the report before or after its 
publication. He also complained that he did not receive 
adequate notice about the appearance of several witnesses 
who testified during the hearing.
Rep. Lent also charged that the minority staff member 
had been deliberately denied access to materials regarding 
the case and voiced his concern that there were now only 
about three companies making prosthetic heart valves and "if 
we keep beating up on these people...we are going to have 
even less than three people in this business." In addition, 
he attacked the credibility and motivation of one of the 
witnesses (a lawyer representing the plaintiffs in a class 
action suit against Pfizer).
Oxley compared the situation to the "pseudo-scare about 
the use of alar on apples" and blamed unscrupulous lawyers 
for creating a climate of panic in heart valve recipients by 
advertising for claimants against the manufacturer.
McMillan, the fourth Republican to attend the hearing ex­
pressed regret that the report issued by the staff was not 
shared with the minority staff prior to the hearing and 
attempted to establish during questioning of witnesses that 
all heart implants involved substantial risk to patients. 
According to the staff member working on this case,
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Pfizer lobbyists "got to the minority. She indicated that 
minority members tried to kill the hearing, but were "blis­
tered" by Dingell and apparently apologized later for inter­
fering with the investigation. She also readily admitted 
that the minority staff member had been intentionally 
slighted during the preparation for the hearing and its 
companion report but justified her decision because "...he 
was a jerk; he is a politico...didn't spend time on the 
issue." ' The animosity which was directed toward the minori­
ty staff member appeared to be of a personal nature and 
might have been unconnected to the larger issue of Republi­
can sympathy for a company under siege.
Summary
Although there did not appear to be significant parti­
san tension between Democrats and Republicans on four of the 
issues (trade, ozone layer, army helicopter procurement, and 
blood supply safety), there was clearly some division on 
three of them and in the generic drug investigation, Repub­
lican cooperation may have resulted, at least in part, from 
a hidden agenda. Therefore, in spite of subcommittee 
staff's depiction of unbiased, nonpartisan cooperation, 
closer inspection of several issues reveals an underlying 
dimension of distinctly different attitudes between Republi­
can and Democratic subcommittee members in at least 37% (and 
possibly 50%) of the cases.
CHAPTER VII 
OUTCOME OP THE INVESTIGATIONS 
Generic Drucr Approval Process
The investigations into the generic drug approval 
process resulted in criminal convictions (to date) of five 
FDA officials, four generic drug manufacturers, nine indus­
try executives and an industry consultant, and federal 
officials indicate there are more to come. By the close of 
the hearings, the FDA commissioner (Frank E. Young) had 
resigned and more than 100 generic drug products, including 
the largest-selling generic, a version of the blood pressure 
medication Dyazide, had been pulled from the market. Of 
approximately 3 6 generic drug companies with more than one 
product on the market, about 18 are currently under criminal 
investigation by the Justice Department.79
In 1990, Dingell and Bliley introduced the Emergency 
Food and Drug Enforcement Act which would have increased the 
resources of the FDA, provided enforcement penalties, and 
given the agency swift recall authority. The bill was 
dropped at the last minute after the Senate, which favored 
more comprehensive legislation covering food, brand name
79Kosterlitz, 1233.
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products, and medical devices as well as generic drugs, 
declined to support it.
On September 25, 1991, the full committee passed 
HR2454, sponsored by Dingell and co-sponsored by every 
member of the committee, which gives the FDA considerably 
more authority to invoke sanctions, including debarment from 
the drug approval process and authority to suspend distribu­
tion of generic drugs of any company which has abused the 
approval process. The act also provides civil penalties as 
well as a "whistleblower award." It is expected to be 
signed into law without opposition during the current con­
gressional session.
Scientific Misconduct
In the wake of the publicity surrounding the Cell 
paper, the NIH established an Office of Scientific Integri­
ty80 to investigate allegations of misconduct involving 
federal research funds. A draft report issued by this 
office indicated that Dr. Imanishi-Kari "probably" fabricat­
ed data in the paper she wrote with Dr. Baltimore.81
In March, 1991, Dr. Baltimore asked that the Cell paper 
be retracted because of evidence that it had included falsi-
80In July 1991, the subcommittee accused NIH director 
Bernadine Healy of obstructing the investigation into the 
Baltimore case and another probe by removing a deputy director 
who was supervising both.
81David L. Wheeler, "NIH Director Accused of Improper 
Interference in Agency's Investigations of Scientific Fraud,", 
The Chronicle of Higher Education. August 7, 1991, A7.
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fied data. Fraud and perjury charges are now being consid­
ered with respect to Dr. Imanishi-Kari.
Medigap Insurance
Following the hearing, Congress tightened federal 
regulation of Medigap insurance as part of the huge budget 
reconciliation bill (PL-101-508, Omnibus Budget Reconcilia­
tion Act of 1990) which cleared Congress on November 5,
1990. Part 5 of the Medicare provisions in Subtitle A 
provided for standardization of Medigap policies, required 
that companies return at least 65 cents of every premium 
dollar in benefits, barred the sales of policies that dupli­
cate Medicare, prohibited the direct sale of Medigap poli­
cies to recipients of Medicaid, mandated that every policy 
sold be approved by insurance regulators at *the state or 
federal level, and forced insurance companies to sell 
Medigap policies to all senior citizens who seek them within 
six months of becoming eligible for Medicare.82
Blood Supply Safety
Following the hearing, the Red Cross committed $120 
million to completely modernize 53 regional blood collection 
centers. Computer systems are now being installed to track 
donors and the blood stock, and laboratory personnel are 
being trained to test properly for infectious diseases. By 
the time these innovations are completed, the United States
82Rovner, 3720.
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will have the most effective blood collection system in the 
world. In this case, no legislation was required to force 
the FDA to direct the Red Cross to change its procedures.
The actions taken by the Red Cross were strictly a voluntary
response to problems which surfaced during the investigation
and hearing process.
Ozone Laver Depletion
The hearing forced the EPA and the administration to 
confront the problems resulting from strict compliance with 
the terms of the Protocol, especially as some of the key 
substitutes recommended by the EPA have proven to be toxic. 
Other substitutes that EPA officials had assumed to be safe, 
such as turpine, appear to be highly inflammatory and are 
being resisted by insurance companies concerned about the 
increased potential of industrial fires.
One of the accomplishments of the 101st Congress was 
major revision of the Clean Air Act after 13 years of hear­
ings and debates. Concerns raised in the subcommittee 
hearings were incorporated into Title VI of the revised 
bill, (PL-101-549, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990), espe­
cially those issues relating to CRFC substitutes and timeta­
bles for their adoption. Federal assistance has been prom­
ised to help bring industries into compliance with pollution 
standards and to assist in identifying and testing substi­
tutes for banned substances. Deadline extensions will be 
granted if acceptable substitutes cannot be found within the
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time limits outlined in the Protocol and the amendments.
Medical Devices
Following the hearing, the FDA initiated a series of 
unprecedented steps to correct the problems which the sub­
committee and other groups addressed. These included remov­
ing the heart valve's Pre Market Approval, initiating a 
patient and physician notification process, and determining 
steps for a criminal investigation against Shiley, Inc. The
i
subcommittee presented the FDA with information that the 
company had withheld information regarding both the alleged 
therapeutic benefits of the valve and the incidence of strut 
failure. In August, 199 0, Shiley announced that it had 
awarded a grant to Medic Alert to implement a worldwide 
patient notification program.
The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 (PL-101-629) 
approved on November 21, 1990, gave the FDA a comprehensive 
framework to regulate medical devices to ensure their safety 
and effectiveness. It required companies to report problems 
with medical devices to the FDA promptly, gave the FDA 
subpoena authority to request documentation when necessary 
and order the recall of devices whenever there is reasonable 
probability that the device will cause adverse health conse­
quences or death.
Army Helicopter Procurement
Following the hearings, Dingell publicly criticized 
plans to purchase the additional 132 Apache helicopters
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remaining on the contract at a cost of $14 million each.
It is difficult to quantify the impact of the Apache inves­
tigation since it didn't succeed in blocking the sale.
Staff members, however, argue that the investigations sent a 
"loud and clear" message to the Army about its procurement 
habits, and that after adverse publicity about the perfor­
mance of the equipment, the Army is finally taking action to 
correct some of the problems with spare parts and adequate 
support personnel. Further, the negative publicity which
I
surrounded the manufacturer, McDonnell-Douglas, for its 
design failures and inability to correct problems with the 
equipment was probably a significant factor in its loss to 
the Boeing/Sikorsky team for the contract for the new Coman­
che helicopter now in the development stages.
Unfair Trade Practices
It is difficult to measure the outcome of continuous 
efforts like trade hearings. A staff member described a 
"successful" hearing as simply a part of a process, inten­
tionally consistent with the actions of main trade negotia­
tions, to provide leverage for key trade officials to use 
with foreign governments and, when necessary, with a reluc­
tant administration. In light of Dingell's protectionist 
position with regard to trade, hearings calling attention to 
inequities in international trade arrangements or the fail­
ure of foreign governments to live up to bi-lateral agree­
ments can be assumed to be part of a long-term strategy to
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boost support for tighter restrictions on foreign trade 
and/or import quotas and increased tariffs. The hearings 
also seem to be clearly designed to prod the administration 
into taking a more aggressive posture during the upcoming 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
Summary
In spite of staff consensus that legislative change is 
not the goal of oversight hearings, four of the eight cases 
I investigated resulted in significant legislation to cor­
rect problems uncovered during the course of the probes. A 
summary of legislative and other actions appears in Table 6.
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TABLE 6
RESULTS OF OVERSIGHT INVESTIGATIONS IN CASES STUDIED 
Case Outcome
Generic drug approvals
Scientific misconduct
Medigap insurance
Blood supply safety
Ozone layer depletion
Medical devices
Helicopter procurement
HR 2454, passed by Energy and 
Commerce Committee? pending 
floor action
Sponsors: all members of 
committee
Agency reform (institution of 
Office of Scientific Integri­
ty, NIH), perjury charges 
pending against Dr. Imanishi- 
Kari
PL-101-508 (Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990) 
Approved: November 15, 1990
$120 million committed by 
American Red Cross to modern­
ize blood collection centers
PL-101-549 (Clean Air Amend­
ments of 1990)
Approved: November 15, 1990
PL-101-629 (Safe Medical De­
vices Act of 1990)
Approved: November 28, 1990
Attempt to block purchase of 
additional units unsuccessful 
Agency reform (efforts to 
provide adequate spare parts 
and personnel)
Contractor failed in bid for 
additional helicopter con­
tract.
Unfair trade practices Ongoing effort to influence
trade legislation.
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis compares an image of the Oversight and 
Investigations Subcommittee obtained through staff inter­
views with one which emerges from inspection of hearing 
reports and newspaper and magazine articles- on eight of the 
issues investigated during the 101st Congress. Staff mem­
bers describe their subcommittee as nonpartisan in nature, 
with an agenda driven primarily by staff initiative, sup­
ported (but not dominated) by an aggressive chairman, and 
directed at enforcement of existing, rather than introduc­
tion of new, legislation. My findings indicate a subcommit­
tee with some level of disagreement between Democrats and 
Republicans on a significant number of cases, markedly 
distinct levels of participation between Democratic and 
Republican members, a subcommittee agenda reflecting the 
political interests of its chairman at a substantial level, 
and inclined to pursue legislative solutions to problems 
unveiled during subcommittee hearings.
The discrepancy illustrates some of the methodological 
difficulties encountered in trying to generate conclusions 
based primarily on interviews with staff members. These 
problems were compounded because members of congressmen's
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personal staffs were reluctant to challenge the subcommittee 
staff depictions of activities as nonpartisan. Nor did 
anyone I interviewed appear willing to criticize Chairman 
Dingell's integrity or tactics. Although it is possible 
that respect for the Chairman is so ingrained as to be 
unquestioned, it is more likely that his personal power and 
forceful personality dictate a prudent response when trou­
blesome questions are raised.
However, some interesting observations about the cases
which were reviewed for this thesis are in order. Investi-!•
gations initiated by staff members tended to become more 
controversial than the issues which originated with Chairman 
Dingell. It is my impression that Dingell uses oversight 
hearings as one of a variety of weapons to further his 
legislative agenda, patiently building a public record of 
problems in a particular area to support legislation which 
he plans to introduce or sponsor at some point in the fu­
ture. This approach seems to be utilized primarily in those 
hearings which result from his own initiative.
On the other hand, staff members tend to be attracted 
to issues which have the potential to generate maximum press 
exposure and publicity to enhance the subcommittee's reputa­
tion as congresional watchdogs. The chairman's unwavering 
support under fire is deeply appreciated by his staff and 
reinforces both their loyalty to him and their respect for 
his integrity. His willingness to absorb criticism for 
their actions may represent a subtle, but deliberate, strat­
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egy aimed at maintaining harmony between the chairman and 
the staff and minimizing any potential difference in philos­
ophy. It is interesting to speculate whether Dingell consid­
ers his staff's ventures into headline-grabbing scandals a 
worthy price to pay for their ability to maintain steady 
pressure on the administration and agencies in areas he 
considers to be vital to the public interest. He may toler­
ate (or even encourage) issue-specific investigations to 
escalate the climate of fear and intimidation generally 
associated with his subcommittee in order to increase its 
clout on the larger issues affecting policy which may be his 
primary concern.
There is little doubt that the competence and skill of 
the subcommittee staff provides the chairman with the tech­
nical expertise to conduct extensive investigations into 
complicated issues. He apparently trusts their instincts 
and experience, allowing them wide latitude in framing and 
pursing investigations which they initiate. In return, 
Dingell's trust, lack of interference, and unwavering per­
sonal support during critical periods have earned him the 
gratitude of his staff who obviously admire him and respect 
his loyalty and integrity.
Although this mutual admiration scenario appears to be 
genuine, there is undoubtedly another, more realistic, 
dimension to the relationship. Dingell's reputation as an 
aggressive opponent of fraud and waste has been enhanced, in 
large measure, by the efforts of an usually diligent and
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dedicated staff. It is, therefore, in his interest to 
retain them and to do whatever is necessary to reinforce 
their zeal and commitment since their activities contribute 
to his prestige and performance in the House. This in­
cludes allowing them free rein to pursue lines of inquiry 
which interest them as well as consistent support if they 
occasionally go too far. In return, the most aggressive of 
these staff members obviously enjoy the attention and power 
which accompanies a position on the subcommittee and have 
obtained an appreciable degree of personal recognition from 
years of widely-publicized investigations. Tactics and 
behavior not only tolerated, but rewarded, on this subcom­
mittee would probably not find the same reception in most 
professional environments. The staff is generally acknowl­
edged to be very well compensated and it is unlikely that 
they are particularly anxious to test the job market within 
other federal agencies or in the Washington community. It 
is to their advantage then to increase Dingell's satisfac­
tion with the performance of the subcommittee by continuing 
those activities which bring favorable attention to their 
chairman while avoiding those which might cause him unneces­
sary political embarrassment or loss of prestige among his 
peers. The task then is to navigate a balance between the 
type of issues which are investigated, enhancing the reputa­
tion of the subcommittee while allowing the chairman to use 
the prestige of the panel to pursue his own policy agenda.
Dingell's commitment to oversight is widely regarded
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and politically advantageous. However, it is quite possible 
that he uses his oversight resources as a tool to influence 
policy in much the same manner as Moss did when he chaired 
the subcommittee. Subcommittee hearings are often a conve­
nient forum for Dingell's own policy views rather than an 
honest attempt to determine administrative compliance with 
legislative intent.
Finally, Dingell's strategy in obtaining Republican 
cooperation by allowing them to take credit’ for oversight 
successes and including them as sponsors on legislation may 
result as much from political necessity as a desire to 
minimize partisan conflict. In spite of his description of 
himself as a "New Deal Liberal", his views are closer to 
those of moderate Republicans on his committee, especially 
with regard to matters affecting industry, than they are to 
many of the members of his own party. Republican interest 
in subcommittee investigations may reflect not only politi­
cal benefits from publicity, as staff members suspect, but 
an underlying sympathy with Dingell's policy agenda. Ten­
sion, when it does arise during the hearings, tends to occur 
over issues selected by subcommittee staff, rather the 
chairman.
The 1980s has seen the issues of the deficit, tax 
reform, and reduced federal spending influence the liberal 
agenda. Congress can no longer afford to allow "pork 
barrel" politics to dominate its activities, as it becomes 
increasingly obvious that there will be less and less pork
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to distribute in the coining decades. The major policy 
issues facing Congress will be regulatory ones: financial 
services, communications, health care, energy, technology, 
transportation, and science. Dingell's investigative sub­
committee appears to be attempting to striking a balance 
between traditional process questions (largely introduced by 
staff members) focusing on wrongdoing and scandals and those 
issues involving policy review, which seem to be initiated 
by Chairman Dingell as part of his strategy' to influence 
upcoming legislation.
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APPENDIX A
INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. House Commit­
tee on Energy and Commerce current and former staff members:
Reid P. F. Stuntz, Chief Counsel and Staff Director. 
Personal interview, Washington, D.C., July 18, 1991.
Michael F. Barrett, Jr., Chief Counsel and Staff Direc­
tor, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
(1981-91). Personal interview, Washington, D.C., July 
24, 1991.
Claudia Beville, Special Assistant. Personal 
interview, Washington, D.C., July 26, 1991.
Bruce F. Chafin, Special Assistant. Personal inter­
view, Washington, D.C., July 30, 1991.
David W. Nelson, Economist. Personal interview, Wash­
ington, D.C., July 31, 1991.
Stephen F. Sims, Special Assistant. Personal inter­
view, Washington, D.C., July 31, 1991.
Peter D. H. Stockton, Research Analyst.* Telephone 
interview, July 22, 1991.
Committee on Energy and Commerce staff members:
David B. Finnegan, Counsel. Telephone interview, 
October 10, 1991.
Donald E. Shriber, Counsel. Telephone interview,
August 6, 1991.
Committee on Energy and Commerce minority staff members:
Thomas C. Montgomery, Minority Counsel. Personal 
interview, Washington, D.C., July 31, 1991.
John Hambel, Minority Counsel and Press Secretary. 
Telephone interview, September 19, 1991.
Dennis B. Wilson, Minority Counsel. Personal inter­
view, Washington, D.C., July 30, 1991.
John Sheik, Minority Counsel. Telephone interview, 
September 20, 1991.
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General Accounting Office
James Shafer, Senior Investigator. (Currently on loan 
to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations for 
one year). Personal interview, Washington, D.C., July 
30, 1991.
Members of personal staff of subcommittee members:
Ellen Donesky, Legislative Assistant to Representative 
Gerry Sikorsky (D-Mn). Telephone interview, October 
10, 1991.
Wendy Horowitz, Legislative Assistant to Representative 
Ron Wyden (D-OR). Telephone interview, October 10, 
1991.
t
Sara Franko, Legislative Assistant to Representative 
Dennis Eckart (D-OH). Telephone interview, October 17,
1991.
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APPENDIX B
FORMAL JURISDICTION OF THE ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE
The formal jurisdiction of the House Energy and Com­
merce Committee includes:
(1) Interstate and foreign commerce, generally
(2) National energy policy generally
(3) Measures relating to the exploration, production, 
storage, supply, marketing, pricing and regulation 
of energy resources, including all fossils, fuels, 
solar energy and other unconventional or renewable 
energy resources
(4) Measures relating to the conservation of energy 
resources
(5) Measures relating to the commercial application of 
energy technology
(6) Measures relating to energy information generally
(7) Measures relating to (a) the generation and mar­
keting of power (except by federally chartered or 
Federal regional power marketing authorities), (b) 
the reliability and interstate transmission of, 
and ratemaking for, all power, and (c) the siting 
of generation facilities, except the installation 
of interconnections between government waterpower 
projects
(8) Interstate energy compacts
(9) Measures relating to general management of the
Department of Energy and the management and all
functions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis­
sion
(10) Inland waterways
(11) Railroads, including railroad labor, railroad, 
retirement and unemployment, except revenue mea­
sures related thereto
(12) Regulation of interstate and foreign communica­
tions
(13) Securities and exchanges
(14) Consumer affairs and consumer protection
(15) Travel and tourism
(16) Public health and quarantine
(17) Health and health facilities, except health care 
supported by payroll deductions
(18) Biomedical research and development.
(19) Nuclear facilities and energy83
83Report on the Activity of the Committee on Enercrv and 
Commerce for the 101st Congress. (Washington: US Government 
Printing Office, 1991), 1-2.
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APPENDIX C
ISSUES INVESTIGATED BY OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 
SUBCOMMITTEE DURING 101ST CONGRESS
During the 101st Congress (1988-90), the Oversight and 
Investigations Subcommittee held 56 days of public and 
executive session hearings on a wide variety of topics.84 
The following is a list of issues examined by the subcommit­
tee during this period. Those which resulted in formal 
hearings are indicated in bold type. An (*) indicates that 
a subcommittee report was issued during this Congress.
Interstate/Foreign Commerce
Fastener Safety 
Trade Investigations
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
Pharmaceutical product patent protection 
Chinese intellectual property and other trade 
concerns 
Copyright problems in Taiwan 
South African steel investigation 
Kawasaki and Nissho-Iwai 
Customs fraud enforcement 
Foreign direct investment (*)
Health issues
Generic drugs
FDA enforcement of Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (*) 
Blood supply safety
FDA surveillance of food imports (*)
Medical devices (*)
Seafood inspections 
Salmonella Enteritidis in eggs 
Insurance for the Elderly 
Medigap insurance 
Long term care insurance 
Government supported research 
Overhead costs 
Scientific misconduct 
Conflict of interest
Other Investigations:
Bottled water (*)
Prescription drug advertising to consumers
84From Report on the Activity of the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce for the 101st Congress. HR-1021, (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 3, 1991), 277.
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Fraud and abuse in clinical laboratories 
Infant mortality 
Lead in housewares
Pesticide Monitoring Improvement Acts oversight 
Sodium Nitro Prusside
Environmental Issues
EPA Office of Inspector General
Superfund implementation
National contingency plan (*)
Office of Technology Assessment Superfund 
report
Review of the Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry 
Management review of the Superfund program 
Oversight of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act
Groundwater monitoring of land disposal 
facilities 
RCRA corrective action program 
RCRA implementation study 
New Jersey manifest tracking system 
Implementation and expansion of the Montreal 
Protocol on CFCs 
Other investigations 
Fuel economy
EPA pesticide tolerance-setti'ng policies and 
procedures 
EPA regulation of asbestos 
International environmental matters 
Gasoline vapor controls
Authority of EPA regarding accidental release 
of toxics
Public participation in EPA settlements 
Environmental degradation in Latvia (*)
Securities and Finance
Insurance company insolvencies and failures (*) 
Insider trading and other abuses 
Procurement abuses by major defense contractors 
Northrup Corporation 
McDonnell Douglas
Army Apache helicopters 
Army CH47D helicopters 
Navy A-12 cost overruns 
AF C-17 transport plane 
Satellite to satellite communications 
Lockheed C-5 crash damage kits 
Army National Guard procurement of Sperry 500 
computers
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Texas Instruments high speed antiradiation 
missile
Other procurement investigations 
Army aviation safety (*)
Bath Iron Works DDG-51 Arleigh Burke 
destroyer
Martin Marietta/Gerlikon1s ADATS 
Adequacy of penalty system 
Army Reserve readiness
Air Force acquisition of telecom systems 
Other investigations
Auditing and accounting 
Merged Surplus and "M" accounts 
Multiple listing of trading options 
Leveraged buyouts (RJR Nabisco) (*)
Federal Credit Assistance and Insurance 
Program
i
Energy Issues
Energy strategy and supply
Health and safety of nuclear weapons facilities(*) 
Safeguards and security at nuclear weapons 
facilities
Other investigations:
Nuclear weapons safety
Scientific integrity at DOE's national labs 
Worker safety at civilian nuclear power 
plants
Technology transfer at DOE 
Property management at Lawrence Livermore 
Labs
Adequacy of controls for tritium
Contract auditing by DOE
DOE1s environmental testing program
DOE work for others
Oil overcharge enforcement
Miscellaneous
OMB interference in agency rulemaking 
Unfair practices - FCC (Telestar)
National Highway Safety Administration 
Seat belts
Motor vehicle safety inspections 
Auto theft
Accidental fires and other problems in 
manufacture of air bags 
Aftermarket brake linings for autos and 
trucks
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APPENDIX D
MEMBERSHIP OP THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS 
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
101st CONGRESS
Democrats:
John D. Dingell (D-MI), Chairman 
Ron Wyden, (D-OR)
Gerry Sikorski, (D-MN)
Cardiss Collins (D-IL)
John Bryant, (D-TX)
Douglas Walgren (D-PA) (first session)
Dennis Eckart (D-OH) (first session)
Rick Boucher (D-VA) (first session)
J. Roy Rowland, (D-GA) (second session)
James H. Scheuer, (D-NY) (second session)
Jim Cooper, (D-TN) (second session)
Republicans:
Thomas J. Bliley, Jr. (R-VA)
Norman F. Lent, (R-NY)
Michael G. Oxley, (R-OH)
Michael Bilirakis (R-FL)
Alex McMillan (R-NC)
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